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CITIZENSHIP, IN THE IMMIGRATION CONTEXT
MATTHEW LISTER*
ABSTRACT
Recently, many international law scholars have begun to argue
that the modern world is experiencing a “decline of citizenship” and
that citizenship is no longer an important normative category.  This
Article argues that, on the contrary, citizenship remains an impor-
tant category and one that implicates considerations of justice.  I ar-
ticulate and defend a “civic” notion of citizenship that is based
explicitly on political values rather than on shared demographic fea-
tures such as nationality, race, or culture.  I use this premise to ar-
gue that a just citizenship policy requires some form of the jus soli
(citizenship based on location of birth) and the jus sanguinis (citi-
zenship based on “blood” or descent) approaches to citizenship acqui-
sition.  I show why arguments against a “civic” notion of citizenship
made by Peter Schuck, Rogers Smith, Peter Spiro, Linda Bosniak,
and Ayelet Shachar, among others, are mistaken.  This justice-based
approach to citizenship also has significant implications for natural-
ization law and policy.  I argue, first, that this approach requires
open and easy naturalization, and I show why the use of naturaliza-
tion policy to foster national identification is wrong.  Second, I
demonstrate that if naturalization is easy and open, then some rules
limiting certain social benefits and privileges to citizens may be com-
patible with justice, thereby providing a foundation for future discus-
sions of alienage law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Citizenship policy is intrinsically tied to immigration policy.
Therefore, it is impossible to create a just immigration policy without
exploring the limits placed on citizenship policy by considerations of
Copyright  2010 by Matthew Lister.
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justice.  The primary question I ask in this Article is how citizenship
may be distributed.  I consider how the good of full membership may
be distributed and made available, paying particular interest to how
new members may join a society and to the sorts of limits that existing
members may place on joining their society.1  A related question is
what makes an individual a member of one society rather than an-
other.  This question becomes increasingly important as we move away
from racially or ethnically defined accounts of citizenship—an ap-
proach that I argue we should adopt.2
Traditionally, citizenship has been distributed in three main ways:
by descent (jus sanguinis),3 by birth within a territory (jus soli),4 and by
naturalization.5  The vast majority of citizens in all states gain citizen-
ship through one or both of the first two methods.6  These citizens are
usually thought of as “natural” citizens, and so we might think that an
inquiry focused on immigration need not say anything deep about
such cases.  But, as I show, these rules have significant import for the
question of citizenship in the immigration context,7 and so we must
work to determine which, or which mix, of the principles is correct—
if any.  I also examine the specifics of naturalization policy in some
detail, seeking to establish the requirements for and boundaries of
such a policy in a just state.8  Answering these questions will take up
the bulk of this Article.
For purposes of this Article, I assume that states have significant,
though not unlimited, discretion to set their own immigration poli-
cies.9  Given this assumption, I discuss the question of citizenship only
1. See infra Parts III, IV.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 15 (5th ed. 2003) (translating jus sanguinis as “right of blood” and defining the
term as “the conferral of nationality based on descent, irrespective of the place of birth”);
see infra Part III.A.
4. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 3, at 15 (translating jus soli as “right of land or R
ground” and defining the term as the “conferral of nationality based on birth within the
national territory”); see infra Part III.B.
5. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship as Social Closure, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PRO-
CESS AND POLICY, supra note 3, at 2, 8 (defining naturalization as the process by which R
“[p]ersons to whom the citizenship of a state is not ascribed at birth may be able to acquire
it later in life”); see infra Part IV.A.
6. Brubaker, supra note 5, at 7–8 (noting that “[t]he vast majority of persons acquire
their citizenship” by ascription).  As this Article makes apparent, I have doubts about
whether “ascription” is necessary for defining such action.
7. See infra Part III.A–B.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. Cf. Joseph Heath, Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Social Contract, 10 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 343, 350 (1997) (noting that “[i]t is widely accepted that states are . . . not
under any obligation to accept as members those who seek to enter through migration”);
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as it is most relevant to the problem of immigration.  In limiting my
inquiry to issues directly relevant to immigration, I hope to make a
sizeable problem somewhat more manageable.  Except where directly
relevant to immigration, I ignore those questions about citizenship
that are at the heart of the debates between liberals and republicans
(in the political philosophy, not the political party sense)—such as the
question of what it means to be a good citizen10 and the many impor-
tant questions related to multiculturalism.11  I do not claim to give
anything resembling a full theory of citizenship.  I will assume much
that would have to be argued for more fully in a work focused exclu-
sively on citizenship or more generally on global justice.
In this Article, I work primarily in a form of ideal theory,12 at least
insofar as I focus on an idealized case in which we have a world of
states, each liberal13 or at least decent,14 that are not below some ac-
ceptable minimum level of wealth.  I will make exceptions to this rule
clear.  I take this ideal case as my focus because it allows me to ignore
considerations relating to refugees and other groups that suffer ex-
treme deprivation.  These are special cases (though sadly common
ones) that are best dealt with separately.  Using this idealized account
allows us to settle on a model that we can use to think about just citi-
zenship policies.
Because I am concerned with an ideal model, I do not devote
significant time to detailed criticism of, and proposals for, reform of
Stephen R. Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 94, 94 (War-
ren F. Schwartz ed., 1995) (arguing that “liberal states have extensive but not unlimited
obligations to admit outsiders”).
10. Compare, e.g., EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIB-
ERAL DEMOCRACY (2004) (arguing in favor of a liberal notion of civic education and “good
citizenship”), and STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MUL-
TICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2003) (same), with PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997) (arguing in favor of a “civic republican” notion of
citizenship).
11. See generally, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
12. For a comprehensive discussion of “ideal theory,” see generally JOHN RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE 7–8 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE].  My use of “ideal the-
ory” is somewhat less stringent than that used by John Rawls.  In my analysis, more facts
about the actual world must be considered.
13. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES]
(“Liberal peoples have three basic features: a reasonably just constitutional democratic
government that serves their fundamental interests; citizens united by . . . ‘common sympa-
thies’; and finally, a moral nature.” (footnote omitted)).
14. Id. at 59–60 (defining “decent peoples” as “nonliberal societ[ies]” whose “basic insti-
tutions meet certain specified conditions of political right and justice and lead its people to
honor a reasonable and just law”).
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the citizenship laws of any particular state.  Instead, my account ex-
plores the idealization of certain aspects of membership in a just state.
While I use examples of laws from several actual states to help expli-
cate principles and to provide concrete examples, the goal of this Arti-
cle is not to critique specific laws but to provide an ideal model.  The
model created in this Article is one to which a liberal state should
aspire.  Accordingly, the model goes beyond the bare minimum re-
quirements that any liberal or decent state must meet if it is not to be
an outlaw state15 and instead sketches the standards that a state must
meet for its citizenship policy to be truly just.
I assume (but do not argue) that there are lesser standards, the
satisfaction of which would qualify a state as a member in good stand-
ing in the international community, at least as to its citizenship policy;
in other words, states that meet these lesser standards would not be
considered outlaw states.  To the extent that states meet these lesser
standards, they should not be pressured to change their citizenship
policies, even if those policies are not fully just.16  My focus, however,
is not on these more minimal standards; instead, I focus on the more
demanding standards to which liberal societies, out of a desire to be
fully just, rightly hold themselves.  Most, if not all, states are not and
have not been fully just, so issues relating to membership in actual
states involve many remedial questions that I cannot hope to ade-
quately deal with in this Article.  I do not attempt, for example, to
provide answers to such hard questions as what is required in
nonideal conditions or why one society should move toward the ideal
if others do not do the same.  I aim to provide a clear picture of the
ideal toward which we should move.  This is a difficult enough prob-
lem for this Article.
My argument is situated within the context of modest cosmopoli-
tanism.  Modest cosmopolitanism holds that despite our duties of jus-
tice to all people, there will remain individual states, and citizens
15. Id. at 90 (defining “outlaw states” as those states that “refuse to comply with a rea-
sonable Law of Peoples” and noting that such “regimes think a sufficient reason to engage
in war is that war advances, or might advance, the regime’s rational (not reasonable)
interests”).
16. See id. at 59–62 (explaining the importance of tolerating nonliberal peoples and
outlining reasons why we should not “insist[ ] on liberal principles for all societies,” despite
concerns that “the social world of liberal and decent peoples is not one that, by liberal
principles, is fully just”); Jon Mandle, Tolerating Injustice, in THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
COSMOPOLITANISM 219, 219–33 (Gillian Brock & Harry Brighouse eds., 2005) (asking
“[w]hy should a society committed to liberal principles of justice and willing to enforce
them domestically refrain from doing so internationally?” and concluding that, in fact,
“the toleration of decent societies does not involve any compromise of liberal principles of
justice, but rather results from that very commitment [to justice]”).
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within those states have more, stronger, and different duties to co-
members than to nonmembers.17  Those who reject modest cosmopol-
itanism will find more cause to disagree with my analysis than those
who accept it, but because I believe this view is the best, or at least the
most plausible, I apply it throughout this Article.  I hope that even
those who reject modest cosmopolitanism can see the value in explor-
ing what such an approach requires of citizenship policy.
II. THE IMPORTANCE AND ROLE OF CITIZENSHIP
Before discussing how we should structure citizenship policies, I
must say something about why citizenship is a good worth discussing.
Although the goodness and importance of citizenship is, to some de-
gree, assumed by modest cosmopolitanism (since it accepts that there
may be greater duties among members than those owed to nonmem-
bers),18 this view also makes the importance of citizenship less clear in
some ways (since significant, albeit smaller, duties are owed to non-
members as well).  There are at least two distinct questions to consider
here—questions that are not often clearly distinguished by those
working in the area.  First, we might ask what role, if any, citizenship
plays in a theory of justice that is compatible with modest cosmopoli-
tanism.  Second, we might ask what good citizenship is to individual
persons; in other words, why is citizenship important as a matter of
morality and personal development?
These two ways of thinking about the importance of citizenship
roughly correspond to the distinction between the right and the
good.19  Communitarians have traditionally defined the right in terms
of the good20 while liberals have taken a different approach—giving
priority to the right, which sets limits to permissible conceptions of
the good.21  I address issues related to both approaches in this Article,
17. See generally, e.g., JON MANDLE, GLOBAL JUSTICE 88 (2006) (describing a sense of
“justice [that] requires that everyone respect the basic human rights of all people” as “a
form of cosmopolitanism”); SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, in BOUNDA-
RIES AND ALLEGIANCES 111, 111–30 (2001) (outlining “two different strands in recent think-
ing about cosmopolitanism”—“[c]osmopolitanism about justice and cosmopolitanism
about culture”).
18. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. R
19. The distinction between the right and the good is found in the works of Immanuel
Kant, John Rawls, and others.  Under this distinction, moral principles, including princi-
ples of justice (or principles of “right”), have priority over and constrain the rational pur-
suit of goods and values.  For further discussion on this point, see JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 140–45 (2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
20. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed.
1998).
21. According to Samuel Freeman:
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though I assume the priority of the right to the good.  My discussion
provides indirect support for the priority of the right by drawing a
compelling, or at least plausible, picture of the role and nature of
citizenship in a just society and in a community of states.
We can express the role of citizenship in a liberal society that
gives priority to the right over the good in the following schematic
form.22  We begin from the idea that social cooperation is necessary
for the development of fully human capacities and for the achieve-
ment of nearly any conception of the good life.23  The next step is to
recognize that, at least in the world we live in and in any world we are
likely to find in the conceivable future, social cooperation presup-
poses political cooperation.24  Political cooperation, however, must be
grounded in some kind of theory of citizenship because citizenship
ultimately instructs us about the groups of people to whom we owe
our duties and against whom we can invoke our rights.25  At the heart
of such a theory of citizenship is the idea of “equal citizenship,” which
is the core of any plausible liberal theory of political cooperation.26
Once specified, the one rational good enables us completely to define right and
justice in maximizing terms, as those courses of conduct that ultimately are most
conducive to causing this independently specifiable state of affairs to obtain.  This
simplifies moral and political deliberation: all conflicts between prevailing norms
and disparate ends are resolvable by ascertaining which combination of ends and
courses of action promote the greater overall balance of good.  And this in turn
provides a rational morality, one that defines for all choices a uniquely rational
thing to do.
SAMUEL FREEMAN, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of the Right, in JUSTICE AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 45, 62–73 (2006); see also RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 19, at R
141 (“In justice as fairness, then, the general meaning of the priority of right is that admis-
sible ideas of the good must fit within its framework as a political conception.”); JOHN
RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 230–32 (2000) [hereinafter
RAWLS, LECTURES] (describing Kant’s approach to the priority of right).
22. Each of the following points is given more detail later in this Article as I discuss
various challenges to the idea of citizenship and the ways it may be acquired in a just state.
The account provided here is no more than a sketch and relies on what is said later and
the referenced works for sufficient support.  In this sketch, I draw heavily on ideas devel-
oped by Rawls, especially in his Political Liberalism. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIB-
ERALISM 15–35 (1991) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].  It seems to me,
however, that these general ideas do not depend on Rawls’s particular view, but are found
in most versions of liberalism and represent strong themes in social contract thinking,
especially as developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. This may seem like question-begging against a more cosmopolitan view, but I do
not think it is so.  As stated, the possibility that we have the same rights and duties in
relation to all people is left open.  I do not think that this is a plausible view, but it will be
closed off by considerations drawn from broader political philosophy and by what I say
later in this Article, not by the definition of citizenship given here.
26. See infra Part II.B.
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While much more could be said about these matters, the intuitive idea
described here will guide us throughout our investigation.
A. The “Decline” of Citizenship?
Despite what may be implied from the preceding sketch, many
scholars contend that citizenship is, for various reasons, of much less
importance today than it was in the past.27  The claim that citizenship
is no longer of great importance, or that it has been “devalued” (to
use Peter Schuck’s term),28 is an increasingly common one.  This
claim, put forward by what Seyla Benhabib calls the “decline-of-citizen-
ship theorists,”29 is presented as a descriptive and a normative claim.
My focus is on the normative claim that, with the spread of interna-
tional human rights, the importance of citizenship has decreased in
that it no longer plays an important role in our political thought.30
Since many of the developments that lead the “decline-of-citizenship
27. See generally, e.g., DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE
DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP (1996); PETER SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AF-
TER GLOBALIZATION (2008); Richard Falk, The Decline of Citizenship in an Era of Globalization,
4 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 5 (2000).
28. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, The Devaluation of American Citizenship, in CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 163, 163–75 (2000) (discussing how “the equality, due pro-
cess, and consent principles have evolved in ways that devalue citizenship”).  Schuck’s
“‘equality principle’” refers to the “strong presumption that government must treat alike
all individuals who are similarly situated.” Id. at 163.  The “‘due process principle’ requires
the government to deal fairly with all individuals over whom it exercises coercive power.”
Id.  The “‘consent principle’ emphasizes that political membership must be grounded in a
continuing consensual relationship between the state and its citizens.” Id.
29. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 115–16
(2004) (stating that “the decline-of-citizenship school” “consider[s] the waning of the na-
tion-state, whether under the impact of economic globalization, the rise of international
human rights norms, or the spread of attitudes of cosmopolitan detachment, as resulting
in the devaluation of citizenship as an institution and practice”).  It should be noted that
Benhabib uses this term to cover a very wide range of views about citizenship and political
philosophy more generally, including those who consider the supposed “decline” of citi-
zenship a positive and those who consider it a negative. See id. at 115.  The common point
among these theorists is the belief that citizenship as traditionally understood is decreasing
in importance in our globalizing world.
30. For an example of this argument, see JACOBSON, supra note 27, at 1–3.  Of course, R
even the strongest proponents of such views recognize that human rights are not univer-
sally accepted and that even states that officially accept them often violate them. Cf., e.g.,
id. at 101 (noting “[t]he lag and ambivalence in the adoption of international human
rights instruments in the United States”).  The point is, however, that the movement to-
ward the acceptance and protection of human rights is taken to be a progressive trend that
will eventually be universal.  Whether this is a plausible claim need not be addressed in this
Article.
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theorists” to disparage citizenship are essential to a liberalism that em-
braces modest cosmopolitanism, I must take this challenge seriously.31
As David Jacobson notes, “Determining who may become a mem-
ber and a citizen is the state’s way of shaping and defining the na-
tional community.”32  Traditionally, membership in a national
community was very important.  As Hannah Arendt explains, citizen-
ship conferred, or at least secured, the “right to have rights.”33  With-
out this right, some groups faced great physical danger, as was the
case for those rendered stateless after the First and Second World
Wars.34  Other groups faced discrimination associated with the exclu-
sion from citizenship, as was the case of Asians in the United States
before changes were made to the naturalization law in the 1940s.35
With the rise of universal human rights on the international level,
the value of citizenship seems to have greatly decreased,36 so that
some scholars now claim that residence, rather than citizenship, is of
the most normative importance.37  Given this development, we may
31. While these concerns about the supposed “decline” of citizenship are common,
they are not necessarily new.  In addition, they are also not necessarily tied to globalization
in its modern form.  Such worries were noted, for example, by Bernard Bosanquet at the
end of the nineteenth century in his articles discussing the duties of citizenship.  In those
articles, Bosanquet provides a quite modern-sounding discussion of whether citizenship
still means anything in the face of the modern world. See B. Bosanquet, The Duties of Citizen-
ship, in ASPECTS OF THE SOCIAL PROBLEM 1, 1–13 (Bernard Bosanquet ed., London, Macmil-
lian & Co. 1895); B. Bosanquet, The Duties of Citizenship—Continued, in ASPECTS OF THE
SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra, at 14, 14–27.
32. JACOBSON, supra note 27, at 5. R
33. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296–98 (1951).  For an excel-
lent discussion and evaluation of Arendt’s argument, see BENHABIB, supra note 29, at R
49–69.
34. Cf., e.g., David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humani-
tarian Law of Occupation, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 323–26, 336 & n.233 (2007) (describing the
plight of “stateless Jews in Europe during” the Second World War).
35. While the “Chinese Exclusion Act” and similar laws were in place, Asians were not
allowed to naturalize in the United States. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
(repealed 1943).  The Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943, but even then, naturali-
zation for Asians (mostly for women married to U.S. citizen men) remained limited.  Full
naturalization rights were not granted to Asians until passage of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 (commonly called the “McCarren-Walter Act”), which removed re-
strictions on naturalization by “nonwhites.” See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
36. See JACOBSON, supra note 27, at 1–3 (outlining the “ongoing paradigmatic shift from R
state sovereignty to international human rights” and arguing that “[w]hat we are witnessing
today is the transforming of the state and international institutions, of their function and
of their very raison, and human rights provide both the vehicle and object of this
revolution”).
37. Id. at vii (arguing that “as the United States and Western European countries ex-
tended social, economic, and civic rights to growing foreign resident populations,” “the
‘value’ of citizenship as a status . . . became more attenuated,” so that, over time, “resi-
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think that “the distinction between citizen[s] and non-citizen[s] is not
very significant,”38 at least in liberal countries that respect human
rights.
In Western Europe, much of this change has come through the
implementation of human rights laws at the state level in an explicitly
transnational form.39  In the United States, the change has come pri-
marily through the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution,40 with the
high-water mark coming in Plyler v. Doe,41 in which the Court held that
states must provide primary education to undocumented aliens.42
While these changes have been seen as admirable by most, not all
agree with this favorable view.  Some scholars argue that such changes
“devalue” citizenship, undermine solidarity among citizens, and dis-
courage immigrants from naturalizing.43  Schuck, for instance, argues
that the “devaluing” of American citizenship has undermined the
“consensual” foundation of membership in liberal societies.44  Schuck
dence became the critical issue in determining access to a basket of rights and privileges,
not citizenship”); see also SPIRO, supra note 27, at 16 (“But the human rights argument may R
not be one about citizenship so much as it is about legal residency status.”).
38. JACOBSON, supra note 27, at 38; see also SPIRO, supra note 27, at 81 (“But in fact, R
citizenship makes very little difference. . . .  Leaving aside the context of immigration law,
resident aliens have essentially equivalent rights.”).  I find Peter Spiro’s argument to be a
significant exaggeration, even beyond the point that the “context of immigration law” is
not a small issue to leave aside.  The important point, however, is that Spiro argues that the
rise of human rights has led to a decrease in the importance of citizenship.
39. For example, parties to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, commonly known as the European Convention of Human Rights,
must guarantee certain rights to “everyone” within their territories regardless of their citi-
zenship.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”); see also JACOBSON, supra note 27, R
at 38–41 (providing examples of constitutional and statutory schemes in several European
states that guarantee aliens certain rights and arguing that “the disappearing distinction
between citizen and alien” results in “devalued” citizenship).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
42. Id. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free
public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial
must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.  No such
showing was made here.”).
43. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 28, at 163–64. R
44. Id. at 168.  According to Schuck:
The consent principle . . . holds that political membership should not be
ascribed to an individual on the basis of the contingent circumstances of his or
her birth.  Instead, it must reflect the individual’s free choice to join the polity, as
well as the polity’s concurrence in that choice.
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believes that it is important, if liberalism is to continue, to “re-value”
American citizenship, and therefore he has applauded changes in im-
migration laws since the mid-1990s that allow states and the federal
government to withhold benefits from noncitizens.45  So far, such
plans have not had complete success in federal courts, though some
important changes were made by the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,46 which limited immi-
grant access to public benefits.47  Further, the last few years have seen
increases in the aggressive enforcement of immigration laws48 and the
passage of local laws aimed against immigrants (especially, but not
only, illegal or undocumented immigrants).49
Two striking facts suggest that many aliens do not consent to citizenship: a
large number of aliens who are eligible to naturalize fail to do so, and most of
those who do naturalize do not apply until well after they become eligible.
Id. (footnote omitted). See generally PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP
WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985) (arguing that member-
ship in a liberal society is based on actual consent and that extending rights to noncitizens,
especially illegal aliens, undermines this consent condition).  In a recent editorial in the
New York Times, Schuck restated his position, arguing that citizenship is, or should be,
based on “mutual consent.” See Peter H. Schuck, Op-Ed., Birthright of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2010, at A19.  Although it is somewhat outside my main area of interest, it is worth
noting that the historical claims made by Schuck in this editorial (and elsewhere) about
the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment are open to considerable doubt.
Mark Shawhan offers an excellent discussion of this point. See generally, e.g., Bernadette
Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898 States’ Rights, the Law of Nations, and
Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 519 (2001); Mark Shawhan, Comment, The Significance
of Domicile in Lyman Trumbull’s Conception of Citizenship, 119 YALE L.J. 1351 (2010); Mark
Shawhan, “By Virtue of Being Born Here”: Birthright Citizenship and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 (Oct. 31, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author and the Maryland
Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1675876.
45. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, The Reevaluation of American Citizenship, in CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS, supra note 28, at 176, 176–206. R
46. Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 402(b), 412, 110 Stat. 2105, 2264–65, 2269–70 (1996)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(b), 1622 (2006)).
47. Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrimination
by the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 357 (2002) (noting that “Congress enacted
sweeping new restrictions on alien access to public benefits in 1996, [which] imposed . . .
restrictions directly on various federal programs [and] authorized the states to restrict
alien access to state benefits and to certain designated federal benefits, including Medicaid
and welfare”).
48. See generally, e.g., Katherine Evans, The ICE Storm in U.S. Homes: An Urgent Call for
Policy Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561, 561–76 (2009) (describing the “in-
creasingly aggressive tactics” used by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (“ICE”) “to enforce U.S. immigration law” and particularly focusing on “its practice
of raiding the homes of immigrants”).
49. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” Immigrants Beware: Local
Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
1, 6–13 (2007) (outlining immigration regulation ordinances enacted by “several states
and municipalities” in 2006 and 2007 in response to “local perceptions that the federal
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It is easy to overstate the similarities between citizens and nonci-
tizens,50 especially for someone who has never had the experience of
living in a state as a noncitizen.  This is especially true if we include
temporary residents and, in particular, illegal or undocumented im-
migrants.  In the United States, the rights of such individuals differ
greatly from citizens and legal permanent residents.51  But, if we focus
on legal permanent residents, it is clear that the rise of human rights
has made a significant difference in their situation, making them sig-
nificantly more like citizens than previously was the case.52  To the
extent that this is true, the “decline of citizenship theorists” are cor-
rect.  What, then, if anything, can we say is important or distinctive
about citizenship?
B. The Importance of Citizenship
Two distinct considerations are important.  First, certain rights
and benefits that should be made available to all citizens in a just soci-
ety may justifiably be kept from legal permanent residents.53  Some of
these disabilities are only temporary, and most benefits must eventu-
ally be made available to any long-term resident, citizen or not.  But, a
just state may withhold some benefits from noncitizens indefinitely.54
The most obvious of these restrictions is the right to full political par-
ticipation, though at least some social benefits also fall into this cate-
gory.  I argue this not to deny Jacobson’s point that citizenship has
become less important with the rise of human rights, but to note that
respect for human rights does not entail full liberal rights.55  As a re-
sult, a just society may reserve certain rights to its citizens.
government [had] failed to enact [sufficiently] comprehensive [immigration]
legislation”).
50. See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurispru-
dence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 185, 211 (1998) (“The rigid bifurcation of citizens and noncitizens
seems fictional in its failure to accurately recognize similarities between the groups . . . .”).
51. See, e.g., D. Carolina Nu´n˜ez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure
Rights and Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 817, 819–20 (noting that
“undocumented immigrants” are “exclude[d]” from voting and “from many federal wel-
fare benefits”).
52. Cf., e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that it is
necessary “when deciding the meaning of the important new statutes dealing with legal
permanent resident aliens to put these provisions in” the appropriate context, which in-
cludes acknowledging “the international role of [the United States] as a global leader in
the defense of human rights”).
53. See infra Part IV.B.  We may be able to restrict even more benefits from temporary
residents, though I do not discuss this possibility to any great degree in this Article.
54. See infra Part IV.B.
55. See, e.g., MANDLE, supra note 17, at 44–45 (acknowledging that human rights “must R
be respected by all, and are owed to all human beings” but stating that, in the context of “a
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Second, citizenship also retains its importance in defining the ba-
sis of social solidarity.  This question involves understanding why a
person should be a member of one community rather than another,
as well as why people should feel motivated to engage in social cooper-
ation.  I show that, when joined with a general theory of justice, an
answer to the first question can set up an answer to the second.
In normal circumstances, a state may not use morally irrelevant
criteria such as racial and ethnic membership to determine immigra-
tion admission any more than it could use those criteria to make any
other decision.56  I expand on this theory to show that a just citizen-
ship policy may not depend on or make reference to ethnic, racial, or
national features.  But, if such features are ruled out, we may question
whether there is any sufficient basis for the sort of social solidarity
necessary to establish and to encourage trust and reciprocity.  If citi-
zenship criteria are created based on a notion of the right and not on
some substantial conception of the good, such as shared culture or
nationality, societies might not develop the internal support necessary
for stability.  I contend, however, that shared membership in a pol-
ity—citizenship—that is just can itself provide the basis for this trust,
and that a “thick” notion of membership is not necessary to ground
citizenship.57
This is an old idea that finds expression, somewhat differently, in
the political thoughts of Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
who argue that freedom is best developed within a republican state
theory of global justice,” human rights “are more limited in content and are given a differ-
ent defense than would be appropriate in other contexts and for other purposes”); Erin
Kelly, Human Rights as Foreign Policy Imperatives, in THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND
THE DISTANT NEEDY 177, 177–92 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004) (stating that “[h]uman
rights must be conceived of narrowly if they are to play the role spelled out for them by
[her] principle of International Responsibility for Human Rights” and noting that this
narrow conception of human rights does not “include the full liberal right to freedom of
expression” or “the right to democratic political participation,” among others).
56. See Perry, supra note 9, at 114.  According to Stephen Perry: R
Restrictions on immigration that are intended to preserve cultural stability should
therefore generally do so not by favoring certain cultures or discriminating
against others, but rather by limiting the overall number of immigrants so as to
ensure that cultural change within the state is not too rapid and present social
forms are not simply overwhelmed.
Id. We might distinguish affirmative discrimination in favor of a particular ethnic or relig-
ious group when done for essentially remedial reasons or to rectify past injustice.  I do not
deal with this significant issue in this Article.
57. For a discussion of the “thin/thick” narrative distinction, see generally MICHAEL
WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994); for a contrast
between the “thin” notion of the good found in Rawls and Kant with “thick” ethical no-
tions, see BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985).
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that is able to form a league of like-minded states.58  The idea also
finds a natural home in the political liberalism of John Rawls and
Charles Larmore.59  In yet a different form, the same idea is put for-
ward by Michael Walzer in his call for an American citizenship that is
deeply and essentially pluralistic60 but focused on developing a civic
virtue that can be shared by all members.61  It is also put forward by
Ju¨rgen Habermas and Jan-Werner Mu¨ller in their defenses of “consti-
tutional patriotism.”62  I will not adjudicate between these competing
conceptions of what we might call a civic notion of citizenship.63  In-
58. See IMMANUEL KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT
WON’T WORK IN PRACTICE 80–81 (E.B. Ashton trans., Univ. Pa. Press 1974) (1793); IMMAN-
UEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (M. Campbell Smith trans., 1903) (1795) [hereinafter KANT,
PERPETUAL PEACE], reprinted in THE PORTABLE ENLIGHTENMENT READER 552, 552–59 (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1995); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On The Social Contract, in BASIC POLITICAL
WRITINGS 141, 148 (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., 1987) (1754) (“At once, in place of the
individual person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and
collective body composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which
receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will.”); see also Pauline
Kleingeld, Kant’s Theory of Peace, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT AND MODERN PHI-
LOSOPHY 477, 477 (Paul Guyer ed., 2006) (“Kant argues . . . that true peace is possible only
when states are organized internally according to ‘republican’ principles, when they are
organized externally into a voluntary league that promotes peace, and when they respect
the human rights not only of their own citizens but also of foreigners.”).  This line of
thought has recently been developed with great skill and relevance to the present discus-
sion by Anna Stilz. See generally ANNA STILZ, LIBERAL LOYALTY: FREEDOM, OBLIGATION, AND
THE STATE 105–09 (2009) (discussing the views that Kant and Rousseau might have on the
question of “global distributive justice” and the relationship of individuals to the state).
59. See generally CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 40–68 (1987)
(developing the idea of “political liberalism”); RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 13 R
(same); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22 (same). R
60. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN AMERICAN 53–77 (1992).
61. See generally id. at 81–101 (discussing civility and civic virtue in America).
62. See generally, e.g., JU¨RGEN HABERMAS, Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Iden-
tity: The Federal Republic’s Orientation to the West, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITI-
CISM AND THE HISTORIANS’ DEBATE 249, 249–67 (Shierry Weber Nicholsen ed. & trans.,
1989); JAN-WERNER MU¨LLER, CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM (2007); Ju¨rgen Habermas, Strug-
gles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 11, R
at 107, 107–49 [hereinafter Habermas, Struggles for Recognition].  As Mu¨ller states, “ ‘Consti-
tutional patriotism’ . . . designates the idea that political attachment ought to center on the
norms, the values and, more indirectly, the procedures of a liberal democratic constitu-
tion.” MU¨LLER, supra, at 1.
63. Mu¨ller distinguishes between what he calls “civic nationalism” and his own favored
view, “constitutional patriotism,” on the ground that “civic nationalism” aims for a “homo-
geneity” of beliefs, even if not of ethnic background, and “more or less directly imperils
values such as inclusiveness, individuality, and diversity.” MU¨LLER, supra note 62, at 78–79. R
We might think that France, with its official policy of secularism, would be an example of
this.  The civic notion of citizenship I develop in this Article, however, is closer to Mu¨ller’s
“constitutional patriotism” than his “civic nationalism” because it does not require a sub-
stantive conception of the good.  Since Mu¨ller’s view is an explicit form of political liber-
alism, as developed independently by Rawls and Habermas, this is unsurprising. Confusion
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stead, I only note a few points that are common among the various
accounts.  In doing so, I illustrate how a civic notion of citizenship can
ground the social solidarity required by a just state without resorting
to exclusive ethnic, national, or racial characteristics and without de-
pending on members believing in mythical stories of national unity or
origin or being subjected to bad faith on a massive scale.64  If success-
ful, I will have gone a long way toward showing the value of citizen-
ship, even after the advent of universal human rights.
A civic notion of citizenship may be theorized in several ways.
Michael Walzer characterizes it as “[c]itizenship . . . separated from
every sort of particularism: the state is nationally, ethnically, racially,
and religiously neutral.”65  The private organizations that make up
“civil society” are “the ground of democratic politics,” since it is in
such groups that we learn the virtues of cooperation and reciprocity.66
But, such a state is also one in which the exercise of political rights
helps us to develop our attachment to the state.67  This approach to
citizenship is explicitly based around political values.  The relation-
ship among and between citizens in a just liberal state is one of “civic
friendship,” a desire to seek “fair standards of social cooperation”; it
does not require citizens to abandon their various moral beliefs or
is almost impossible to avoid in this area given the variety of terminology used by various
writers, but I stick, for better or for worse, with a “civic notion of citizenship.”
64. For a discussion of the role of bad faith in formulating national solidarity, see gen-
erally Simon Keller, Patriotism as Bad Faith, 115 ETHICS 563 (2005).  Rogers Smith has ar-
gued at great length that various “stories of peoplehood” are necessary elements in any
stable society. See ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP 5 (2003) (discussing “the fundamental and pervasive role that sto-
ries of peoplehood play in political life”).  In Smith’s account, these stories almost always
involve large-scale falsehoods, mythical beginnings, and half-truths. See id. at 44–45 (not-
ing that these stories contain “a certain account of the past and present that is usually
selectively stylized if not mythical”).  The depressing idea that false beliefs are necessary for
social cooperation is defended by Smith through historical analysis and speculative claims
about human psychology.  What results is a deeply elitist, undemocratic, and anti-Enlight-
enment view in which certain select groups (including, it seems, political theorists) see the
stories for the falsehoods that they are but use them to keep the rabble happy enough to
pay taxes and get along.  I find this inadequate as a historical description and implausible
as a normative ideal.  Indeed, the tendency to slide between speculative descriptive claims
and normative conclusions is a constant flaw in Smith’s book.  Because I argue that people
in a democratic society are mature enough to base their cooperation on true claims, I
reject Smith’s view.
65. WALZER, supra note 60, at 9. R
66. Id. at 18 (noting that “American citizens acquire political competence within secon-
dary and often parochial associations”).
67. See id. at 18–19 (arguing that “it is the exercise of political rights that gives them
value in the eyes of the citizens” and that “participatory politics . . . enhances the citizen’s
commitment to the larger community”).
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ethnic or cultural backgrounds.68  These “fair standards for social co-
operation” focus not on the moral values or cultural background of
citizens, since these may be quite diverse, but on the process of law-
making and the use of state power.69  In this way, the civic notion of
citizenship helps make the good of citizenship possible.
In a pluralistic society, citizens do not expect general agreement
on the good70 but can agree on the political arrangements that allow
each individual to pursue his own various conceptions of the good.71
It is these political arrangements to which we owe allegiance as citi-
zens.  Importantly, these ideas are not merely abstract—they necessa-
rily involve the notion of being part of a particular system of social
cooperation, of taking part in a political system.72  We need not go as
far as Aristotle and state that we are essentially political animals,73 but
we can affirm Rousseau’s contention that in society we become more
than brutes and animals.74  Political cooperation is a part of social co-
operation and a necessary feature of it; without political cooperation,
we would not have the stability necessary for social cooperation.75  So,
a civic notion of citizenship is rooted in the idea of social cooperation,
68. See Amy Gutmann, Rawls on the Relationship Between Liberalism and Democracy, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 168, 185–86 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
69. See Habermas, Struggles for Recognition, supra note 62, at 134–35. R
70. See LARMORE, supra note 59, at 124 (noting that “there is no general agreement R
about ideals of the person” in “pluralistic societies”).
71. According to Rawls:
[R]easonable persons will think it unreasonable to use political power, should
they possess it, to repress comprehensive views that are not unreasonable, though
different from their own.  This is because, given the fact of reasonable pluralism,
a public and shared basis of justification that applies to comprehensive doctrines
is lacking in the public culture of a democratic society.
See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 60–61. R
72. By “taking part in a political system,” I do not necessarily mean taking part in politi-
cal activity, though that may be an especially powerful way to take part.  Rather, I have in
mind the more day-to-day activities involved with availing one’s self of a system of social
cooperation made possible by the rule of law, public standards, and regulations, and so on.
73. ARISTOTLE, The Politics, in THE POLITICS AND CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 9, 13 (Ste-
phen Everson ed., B. Jowett trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1996) (“And he who by
nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above
humanity . . . .”).
74. SAMUEL FREEMAN, Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views, in JUSTICE AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON RAWLSIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 17, 22 (2007) (“Rousseau
maintains, contrary to Hobbes, that as an isolated being, man is a ‘stupid and shortsighted
animal,’ tranquil by nature, and driven only by sensation and instinct.” (footnote omit-
ted)); see also STILZ, supra note 58, at 113–36 (discussing Rousseau’s models of freedom and R
culture).
75. This is, of course, one of the lessons we learn from Thomas Hobbes, although we
need not think that his account of political cooperation follows from the more basic point.
See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 106–08 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co.
1994) (1668).
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which in turn includes the idea of political cooperation.  But, if we
accept the argument made by Kant and others (as we should) that
political cooperation that respects individual autonomy requires a
number of distinct republics,76 then a civic notion of citizenship en-
tails membership in one (or more) distinct state(s).  That is to say,
citizenship remains an important feature in our moral world, even
when we accept universal human rights.77
C. Potential Objections to a Civic Notion of Citizenship
There are several potential objections to this account.  I consider
four such objections.
1. Thinness
First, and most briefly, we might worry that a civic notion of citi-
zenship is too thin to ground social cooperation.78  This worry may be
based on the idea that we need “thicker” narratives to ground cooper-
ation or in the claim that diversity, which is an inevitable outcome of a
“thin” notion of identity, leads to a lack of trust and social solidarity.79
Both claims are mistaken.
The notion that we need “thicker” narratives to ground coopera-
tion is often associated with communitarian thought.80  In light of this
76. KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE, supra note 58; see also Kleingeld, supra note 58, 485–88 R
(arguing that Kant’s position is that “the only way to leave the state of nature among states
is by starting with a league of states, while [a] federation [of states] remains the ultimate
ideal”).
77. Although I will not argue the point here, my view is that human rights depend on
social cooperation and therefore political cooperation, for their very foundation and cer-
tainly for their best degree of efficacy.  Political cooperation, in turn, includes the idea of
citizenship.
78. See supra note 57. R
79. Recent work by Robert Putnam purports to show that diversity leads to decreased
trust among citizens, though I am somewhat skeptical of his claims. See generally Robert D.
Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINA-
VIAN POL. STUD. 137, 138 (2007) (arguing that “[i]n the short to medium run . . . immigra-
tion and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital”).  Stephen
Macedo, in a recent unpublished paper, argues that Putnam’s work gives liberals who sup-
port a welfare state good reason to restrict immigration. See Stephen Macedo, When and
Why Should Liberal Democracies Restrict Immigration? (2008) (unpublished paper)
(manuscript at 3) (on file with author and the Maryland Law Review) (“A political commu-
nity’s special and urgent obligations to its least well off members may take priority over the
claims of some even poorer people abroad.  If particular patterns of immigration worsen
domestic economic disparities and undermine commitments to social justice, these are
reasons . . . for revising immigration policies.”).
80. See generally, e.g., DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE
141–42 (2008) [hereinafter MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY] (describing “communitar-
ian intuition[ ]” as the notion that “we have identities that connect us to larger groups of
people, and we often feel vicarious pride or shame in what they do”); DAVID MILLER, ON
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theoretical background, it is ironic that a strong answer to this con-
cern is found in Walzer’s work.  In What It Means to Be an American,
Walzer explains that a civic notion of solidarity and citizenship may be
constructed out of purely political values and by building on the vari-
ous groups that make up civil society.81  Citizens retain their member-
ship in various groups while supporting the political society that
makes civil society stable.  To use Rawls’s terms, a just society is a “so-
cial union of social unions”82 that makes possible the particular as-
sociations that make our lives meaningful and secure.  Because
citizens can affirm membership in society on these grounds, this ap-
proach is not too thin to attract and to maintain loyalty.83
The second aspect of the objection is the claim that a civic notion
of citizenship will lead to diversity, but that this diversity undermines
the trust needed to develop a just system of reciprocity.84  Many recent
scholars have made this claim, often building on the work of Robert
Putnam, among others.85  This claim is, however, overblown for sev-
eral reasons.  To start, it takes contingent and time-bound facts as nec-
essary and therefore fails to afford enough weight to our ability and
duty to change them.  So, even if trust is lowered when we see groups
as the “other,” a group that is currently “other” may not always be seen
as such.  The integration of Irish, Jewish, Italian, and Eastern Euro-
NATIONALITY 72 (1995) (“It is because we have prior obligations of nationality . . . that the
practice of citizenship properly includes redistributive elements of the kind that we com-
monly find in contemporary states.”); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 61–63 (1983) (describing concerns about the development of
“communities of character” and arguing that “[t]he determination of aliens and guests by
an exclusive band of citizens . . . is not communal freedom but oppression”).
81. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 60, at 18 (“Civil society is for us the ground of demo- R
cratic politics, and this is ground that must be tended by the state.”).
82. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 527. R
83. How Walzer’s account in What It Means to Be an American, supra note 60, fits with his R
account in Spheres of Justice, supra note 80, in which he suggests that solidarity requires a R
notion of community stronger than a merely civic notion, is a difficult question, which, to
my knowledge, Walzer has not specifically addressed.  It might be that the account in What
it Means to Be an American should be taken as an account of American citizenship and not as
an example of a more general account of liberal principles of citizenship and membership.
This account would mesh with the relativism found in Spheres of Justice and other works by
Walzer. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987).
It might also be that Walzer’s relativism has softened over time.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. R
85. See, e.g., David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the Death Penalty Internationally,
33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 295, 303 (2008) (concluding that “ethnically diverse societies
should be more likely to have capital punishment” because “[e]thnic diversity . . . reduces
social participation and trust”); Jonathan Haidt et al., Hive Psychology, Happiness, and Public
Policy, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S133, S151 (2008) (“We . . . believe that the unquestioning cele-
bration of diversity should give way to more careful scrutiny and to a full cost-benefit
analysis.”).
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pean groups into mainstream “white” society in the United States
shows how this is possible.  In fact, there is reason to believe that it is a
civic notion of citizenship that helped make this possible, especially
when we consider the more successful integration of immigrants and
minorities in Canada and the United States as compared to states such
as Germany and France.86
Next, the claim that diversity undermines trust is not universally
true, and it is particularly false in Canada, a society that has a largely
civic notion of citizenship.87  Importantly, Canada’s evolution into a
social democracy came only after the country repealed its explicitly
racist immigration laws and evolved into a significantly more diverse
society.88  This example puts to rest the claim that there is a necessary
conflict between a civic notion of citizenship and the degree of trust
needed for social solidarity.89  Indeed, as Mu¨ller points out, a more
plausible interpretation is that the development of the welfare state in
various societies has grown, not out of a notion of “communal trust,”
but through the active political struggle of various segments of society
seeking respect and recognition as equals worthy of fair treatment.90
This political struggle is centered around constitutional essentials and
86. See, e.g., Eddie Bruce-Jones, Race, Space, and the Nation-State: Racial Recognition and the
Prospects for Substantive Equality Under Anti-Discrimination Law in France and Germany, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 423, 433 (2008) (“In both France and Germany, people of color
are commonly referred to as immigrants and foreigners (immigres and Auslander, respec-
tively), regardless of nationality, or German or French cultural integration.  This appella-
tion creates a discursive framework under which integration of non-white people as
German or French is a crude fantasy.” (footnotes omitted)).
87. Ayelet Shachar, The Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIR-
IES L. 367, 372 (2007) (describing Canada as an “archetype[ ] of the civic model”).
88. Canada first put restrictions on “Chinese” (meaning essentially all East-Asian) im-
migration in 1885 in the form of an immigration tax. JAMES P. LYNCH & RITA J. SIMON,
IMMIGRATION THE WORLD OVER: STATUTES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 55 (2003); see also David
Dyzenhaus, The Grudge Informer Case Revisited, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000, 1027 n.92 (2008)
(describing the Canadian immigration tax as “very onerous and explicitly racist”).  The
1923 Immigration Act barred nearly all Asian immigration, although it was amended in
1931 to allow the Asian spouses of Canadian citizens to immigrate into Canada. LYNCH &
SIMON, supra, at 55–56.  In 1946, a new immigration policy was put in place that continued
restrictions on “Asiatic immigration,” which applied to nearly everyone in the Eastern
Hemisphere and prohibited immigration by all blacks unless they were of a preferred class.
Id. at 57.  Absolute racial discrimination was removed only in 1962, though preferential
treatment was still given to “European” immigration. Id.  It was not until the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1976 that full equality on the basis of race was established in Canada.
See id. at 57–58.
89. Why was Canada able to become more diverse and more just at the same time?
The simple answer is better leadership.  A more optimistic answer is that greater diversity
can itself lead to more liberal values. See generally, e.g., Will Kymlicka & Keith Banting,
Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 281 (2006).
90. MU¨LLER, supra note 62, at 73–74. R
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political values rather than ethnic or even cultural values,91 and is
therefore in line with the civic notion of citizenship.
2. Nonexclusivity
The next set of criticisms comes from Peter Spiro’s recent book
Beyond Citizenship.92  His criticisms relate to the fear that a civic notion
of citizenship cannot do the work needed because it is not exclusive in
the same way as an ethnic or nationalistic notion of citizenship.
Spiro’s first criticism is that a civic notion of citizenship cannot work
because it fails to sufficiently differentiate among states.93  Liberal po-
litical values can and are held by people all over the world.94  Spiro
argues that if adherence to liberal values is necessary for a civic notion
of citizenship, then there is no good reason to justify a state’s decision
to exclude noncitizens or to differentiate between citizens and nonci-
tizens.95  As Spiro states:
To the extent that America has been defined by its adher-
ence to a distinctive governance system, it loses that identity
insofar as the system becomes universal.  If individual Ameri-
cans used to be identified by their faith in that system, they
also lose that identity insofar as others claim similar faith.
Once everyone is an American, no one is an American.  Identity
and community boundaries are ultimately about difference.
Once the difference disappears, the identity disappears with
it.  If indeed we have become a civic nation, we are on the
way to being a nation no more.96
Spiro’s concern operates in two ways.  First, if American citizen-
ship is based on civic ideals,97 then what justifies excluding an outsider
who shares those ideals, as many do today?98  Second, if our loyalty is
to a set of ideals that are shared by many countries, it is unclear why
anyone would choose loyalty to one state over another.99  The connec-
tion between a citizen and the state, Spiro claims, is therefore too arbi-
91. Id. at 73 (“[W]elfare states have come about as a result of political struggles for
participation and justice.” (emphasis omitted)).
92. See generally SPIRO, supra note 27. R
93. See id. at 52.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 47.
96. Id. at 52.
97. Id. at 46–47 (noting that America is “above all, a ‘civic’ nation”).
98. See id. at 116.
99. Cf. id. at 52 (arguing that if “democracy alone emerges as a legitimate system of
government,” the American identity, “defined by its adherence to a distinctive governance
system,” may well disappear).
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trary to ground normative considerations, especially ones of great
importance.100
This line of criticism misses the point and the importance of the
civic notion of citizenship and ignores the nature of social and politi-
cal cooperation discussed above.101  While it is true that liberal ideals
are an essential part of the civic notion of citizenship, they are essen-
tial only insofar as they regulate a scheme of cooperation.102  So, ac-
ceptance of and adherence to such ideals in the abstract is only one
part of cooperation.  Actual participation in the life of a society is an-
other essential aspect, one that nonmembers do not enjoy, at least to
the same degree.  As Joseph Raz notes: “Meaning comes through a
common history, and through work.  They make the object of one’s
attachment unique.”103  So, the point that liberal ideals are held by
nonmembers and citizens alike does not, by itself, show that the civic
notion is insufficient because it fails to consider the significance of
work, a common history, and the experience of actually living
together.104
Consider a comparison.  A family should be formed around a cer-
tain notion of love.  But, not everyone who has this sort of love can
enter or be part of any particular family.  Moreover, the fact that dif-
ferent families profess to serve the ends of love and family harmony
does not make it irrational to love one’s own family and seek its good
100. Id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83. R
102. Michael Blake suggests that living under a shared coercive order is the relevant
moral notion for determining political obligations, while Andrea Sangiovanni suggests that
sharing in a system of reciprocity is the salient point. See generally Michael Blake, Distributive
Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 257 (2001); Andrea Sangiovanni,
Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2007). In my opinion, these
approaches are complementary rather than competitive and both support the point at
issue.
103. JOSEPH RAZ, VALUE, RESPECT, AND ATTACHMENT 20 (2001).
104. In conversation, Peter Spiro has suggested to me that he believes that this common
history is no longer significant because social cooperation is no longer limited to distinct
states.  It is true, of course, that social cooperation is not limited to interactions within
states.  This fact does not, however, support Spiro’s contention for two reasons.  First, sig-
nificant cross-border social interaction is not a recent phenomenon; in fact, it has existed
at many times, in large scale, throughout history. See supra note 31 (discussing concerns R
about the decline of citizenship considered, and answered, by Bernard Bosanquet in the
nineteenth century). See generally SASKIA SASSEN, GUESTS AND ALIENS (1999) (extensively
detailing the history of migration and showing that large-scale migration has been a regu-
lar pattern for hundreds of years).  If such interactions are not new, this cannot be a new
challenge to the notion of citizenship.  Second, even social cooperation and interaction
that take place across borders depend heavily on political cooperation at the state level for
stability; this dependence gives those who take part in social cooperation reason to support
and identify with the states that make such cooperation possible.
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rather than another’s.  Similarly, all corporations are primarily con-
cerned with making a profit.  That does not mean, however, that any-
one who wishes to maximize profits may join any corporation or that
members of any one corporation have as much reason to maximize
the profits of any other corporation as they do their own.  Thus, facts
of interaction and participation (and history) play an important nor-
mative role in individuating group duties and obligations.
3. Arbitrariness
Even if we accept my arguments against Spiro’s account, we
might still think that citizenship determinations cannot be morally im-
portant because they are “arbitrary” in some sense.  This view is mis-
taken.  Even if it is correct to say that one’s nation of citizenship is
“arbitrary,” it is not necessarily true that citizenship is arbitrary from a
moral point of view.  Citizenship is based on, and a necessary feature
of, social cooperation105—something that can only be done within
particular groups.  Even if any group would do, once one is a part of a
particular group, moral obligations are formed to that group.  Again,
a comparison may illustrate the point.  Perhaps it is morally arbitrary
that a woman is the mother of one child rather than another.  But,
because she is the mother of that particular child, she has particular
obligations to him.  Similarly, if certain morally arbitrary facts about
my history were different, then I would have different friends.  Re-
gardless, I have the same moral obligations to my actual friends and
do not have such obligations to other potential friends, even if those
friends would have served just as well.  So, even if certain facts about
us are in some ways arbitrary, they are not precluded from having sig-
nificant moral importance in their actual implementation.  Having a
particular history specifies our duties and makes them concrete, even
if this history is not in itself morally important.  In light of these illus-
trations, Spiro’s objections to the civic notion of citizenship seem
moot.106
105. See Tommie Shelby, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1697, 1703 (2004) (defining “citizenship” as “participat[ion] in a fair system of social
cooperation over a complete life” (citing RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at R
18–22, 299–302)).
106. I do not present friendship or the family as analogous to citizenship in a state.
There are, of course, deep and important differences.  The examples of friendship and the
family serve as counterexamples to the general claim that a relationship cannot be morally
important or give rise to moral claims if it depends on morally arbitrary accidents of his-
tory.  Therefore, those who argue that the “arbitrary” nature of citizenship determinations
means that citizenship cannot be morally important must argue that something is special
about the case of citizenship that makes this claim correct in that context.  As far as I can
see, no such argument has been made, and as there are arguments against the general
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4. Cosmopolitanism
The final challenge to the civic notion of citizenship is a related
one that we might call the cosmopolitan challenge.  This challenge is
succinctly stated by Linda Bosniak who claims that we should give up
and move beyond the idea of citizenship because any “national soli-
darity” project must “categorically privilege” insiders in a way that is
incompatible with equal respect for all people.107  Instead, Bosniak
argues, we should “maintain[ ] solidarity with the powerless” all over
the world regardless of their citizenship.108
It is hard to see why these contentions should be seen as in con-
trast to the civic notion of citizenship developed in this Article.  Equal
respect for all people is a feature of the modest cosmopolitanism in
which this project is situated.109  But, equal respect for all people does
not require, nor could any plausible moral or political theory require,
that we actually treat all people the same way or seek to promote the
legitimate ends of all people to the same degree.  To think otherwise
is to confuse the essential idea of equal respect with the fundamen-
tally different idea, drawn from utilitarianism, of equal considera-
tion.110  Only the first approach is essential to a civic notion of
citizenship, and a strict attempt at the second approach is not plausi-
ble.111  Actually attempting to give equal consideration to the ends of
all people would make nearly all forms of human life impossible.
Such a project would make impossible not only commercial life (al-
though this is an obvious example) but also family life and friend-
claim, found in this Article and in the works cited previously by Kant, Rawls, Rousseau, and
others, I take the “arbitrary nature” argument to be a failure.
107. Linda S. Bosniak, A National Solidarity?: A Response to David Hollinger, in IMMIGRA-
TION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 101, 104 (Noah M. J. Pickus ed., 1998).
108. Id. (stating that she is “most of all committed to a political and cultural position
that repudiates any overarching, authoritative form of solidarity, and that ensures the
space for disparate visions of solidarities and citizenship identities—including, but not sub-
ordinated to, national solidarities and national citizenship identities”).
109. See, e.g., MANDLE, supra note 17, at 88 (noting that cosmopolitanism encompasses R
the notion that “justice requires that everyone respect the basic human rights of all
people”).
110. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272 (1977) (“Government
must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who are capable of
suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of
forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived.” (empha-
sis added)).
111. For an argument demonstrating that even utilitarians ought to accept “special” par-
tial duties, see Robert E. Goodin, What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?, 98 ETHICS
663, 664–66 (1988).
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ship.112  So, partiality must be acceptable, at least in some cases.  What
is important, and what is implied by modest cosmopolitanism, is that
we have a duty to make sure that the basic rights of all people are met,
at least insofar as we are able to do so.  This is, in my opinion, the
most plausible way to understand Bosniak’s notion of “solidarity with
the powerless.”113  Understood this way, the idea is not at all incom-
patible with the civic notion of citizenship, which respects our duties
toward noncitizens and does not disrespect groups of people by cate-
gorically excluding them from citizenship in ways that ethnic or na-
tionalistic notions of citizenship exclude them.114
Further, if we believe that the best way to realize universal human
rights is with a system or federation of liberal or at least decent
states,115 then we are justified in believing that the civic notion of citi-
zenship, as an essential component of the internal organization of just
liberal states, is not an obstacle to properly conceived cosmopolitan
values but rather a precondition for them.  Properly interpreted, then,
the cosmopolitan challenge presents no valid objection to the civic
notion of citizenship.
D. Summary
In this Part, I provided a brief sketch of the civic notion of citizen-
ship and defended it against four common criticisms.  This notion of
citizenship is inherently political and rejects the idea that citizenship
is, or should be, based on a common culture, ethnicity, or national-
ity.116  The notion’s role in making possible the social cooperation
necessary for the development of our human capabilities shows that
this is the correct account of citizenship.117  In turn, this notion of
citizenship provides space for citizens to pursue their various concep-
tions of the good and thereby provides an answer to the question
112. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Families, Nations, and Strangers, in BOUNDARIES AND ALLE-
GIANCES, supra note 17, at 48, 48–65 (discussing the nature of various responsibilities, in- R
cluding the responsibility owed “to our families and friends, to the people in our
neighbourhoods and communities, to the members of other groups with which we are
affiliated, and, of course, to those vast numbers of people who are strangers to us, and with
whom our only significant social bond, if it can be called that, is that we are all members of
the human race” and arguing that “the conflicting tendencies on the political level toward
integration and differentiation are mirrored within our moral thought by conflicting views
about the boundaries of our responsibilities”).
113. Bosniak, supra note 107, at 104. R
114. I discuss this point further later in the Article. See, e.g., text accompanying notes
133–34. R
115. See supra text accompanying note 58. R
116. See supra Part II.A.
117. See supra Part II.B.
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about the role of citizenship in the moral development of
individuals.118
III. WAYS OF GAINING CITIZENSHIP
Having sketched the appropriate nature of citizenship for a lib-
eral state and shown why citizenship is important, even if we accept
universal human rights, I turn to more specific issues of citizenship
policy.  In the following Sections, I discuss the ways of gaining citizen-
ship, debate which mixture of them should be used in a just state, and
outline some of the limits that considerations of justice place on the
citizenship policy of a liberal state.119  Citizenship is gained in three
main ways: by descent or “blood” (jus sanguinis),120 by location of
birth (jus soli),121 or by naturalization.122  I argue that a liberal state
must combine elements of all three approaches.  Each approach, how-
ever, presents its own specific problems and so each must be looked at
carefully in turn.
A. Jus Sanguinis
The rule of jus sanguinis is a good place to start a discussion of
citizenship policy for two reasons.  First, all states incorporate at least
some form of this rule into their citizenship policies.123  Second, the
large majority of individuals gain access to citizenship by this
method.124  This basic rule can vary in strength.  Not all versions of jus
sanguinis are compatible with liberal principles of justice.  Some are
compatible, but not required, while others are required.  Before dis-
cussing these points further, it is worth pausing to discuss various ways
the approach may be implemented and to consider the meaning of
“stronger” and “weaker” versions.
118. See supra Part II.C.
119. See infra Parts III.A–B, IV.A.
120. See infra Part III.A.
121. See infra Part III.B.
122. See infra Part IV.A.
123. SPIRO, supra note 27, at 10–11. R
124. Jordan Collins, Same Laws, Different Century: The Bureau of Industry & Security’s Role in
Global Trade & National Security, 15 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 108, 116 (2006) (noting
that “141 countries including Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, and Afghanistan[ ] confer
citizenship exclusively by jus sanguinis, requiring more than just birth within a countries’
[sic] borders to confer citizenship” (emphasis added)).  We might worry about “double
counting” since, in many countries, a child born to a citizen would, in most cases, gain
citizenship either by the jus sanguinis rule or the jus soli rule.  But, it is proper to count the
jus sanguinis rule as the more basic rule in such cases because it applies regardless of place
of birth in most cases, while the same is not true of the jus soli rule.
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1. “Strong” Jus Sanguinis
The strongest version of jus sanguinis equates citizenship with eth-
nic membership, so that citizenship “flows with the blood,” so to
speak.125  Such an approach grants citizenship to all (and perhaps,
though not necessarily, only) members of a defined ethnic group, re-
gardless of any territorial considerations.126  Something like this ap-
proach is found in Germany, Japan, and, to a somewhat lesser degree,
in other states.127  In its most extreme version, this approach is usually
coupled with rejection of the principle of jus soli128 and with very re-
strictive or nonexistent naturalization rules,129 although this is not
strictly necessary.
In this very strong form, jus sanguinis is likely incompatible with
liberal principles in two ways.  First, if descent is the only way to gain
citizenship, as has essentially been the case in Japan130 and to a some-
what lesser degree in pre-1999 Germany,131 then some people who
125. See Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in
CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17, 18 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001) (noting that “many academic and popular observers . . .
attribute a jus sanguinis regime to the ethnic character of its framer’s conception of
nationhood”).
126. See Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 24 n.41 (2006) (noting that a jus sanguinis theory of citizenship does
not “presume[ ] residence in [a] territorial state”).
127. See LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 88, at 225 (noting that “Japan is not and Germany R
was not [until recently] an immigrant nation”).  These countries, until recent times, of-
fered citizenship with only small formalities to members of their self-defined ethnic
groups, even when these persons never lived in the relevant country, and often even if no
relative had lived in the relevant country for several generations.  Japan and Germany, in
particular, also greatly restricted access to citizenship to nonethnic Japanese or Germans
respectively. Id. at 195 (Japan); id. at 176–77 (Germany). But see id. at 186 (stating that
“Germany passed a major immigrant act [in 1999] that cut the links between blood ties
and nationality that had been in effect since 1913”).  At present, Japan’s citizenship laws
most closely resemble the “strong” version presented here. See id. at 189 (“Of all the major
industrial nations in the world, Japan has worked the hardest at maintaining a homoge-
nous, distinctive culture in which foreign influences and foreigners have been barely visi-
ble.”); id. at 225 (describing “Japanese immigration policy” as “absolute in its exclusion of
foreigners for the purpose of permanent settlement”).
128. See, e.g., Graziella Bertocchi & Chiara Strozzi, The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic
and Institutional Determinants, 53 J.L. & ECON. 95, 102 (2010) (noting that “many former
British and Portuguese colonies rejected the jus soli tradition and switched to an often
strongly ethnically tinged version of jus sanguinis” during the decolonization process).
129. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Immigration and Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 35, 58 (1990) (noting that Germany’s “jus sanguinis
principle of citizenship” was coupled with “a highly restrictive naturalization policy”).
130. LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 88, at 195–96. R
131. Id. at 176–77.
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deserve citizenship in a particular state will be denied it.132  If justice
requires that some people are able to acquire citizenship by location
of birth or by naturalization, then any approach to citizenship that
takes descent to be a necessary (not just sufficient) condition for gain-
ing citizenship will be unjust.
The strong form of jus sanguinis (which equates citizenship with
ethnic membership) is also potentially incompatible with liberal prin-
ciples of justice for a second reason: Such an approach is likely incom-
patible with the liberal conception of citizenship sketched above.133
In this view, de facto membership in a certain political community is
essential to citizenship.  But, if citizenship is distributed on the basis of
ethnic membership, then it is both overinclusive and underinclusive.
It is underinclusive because it excludes some who are, or would be,
fully contributing members of a political community for morally irrel-
evant reasons beyond their control.  It is also overinclusive.  Strong jus
sanguinis extends citizenship, or at least the right to access to citizen-
ship as a matter of right, to some who are not, and who need not be,
members of the political community in question.  Any citizenship pol-
icy that distributes citizenship along ethnic lines will grant these rights
to some individuals who are not members of the political
community.134
At first, it might not be obvious that a strong jus sanguinis ap-
proach is incompatible with liberal principles, at least if it is not the
only way to gain citizenship.  (In cases in which ethnic membership is
the only way to gain citizenship, however, this point will apply to an
even greater degree.)  Such an approach is problematic, even when it
is only a sufficient and not a necessary requirement, for it favors some
groups over others for the benefits of citizenship; particularly prob-
lematic is that this bias is not based on cooperation and reciprocity135
but on morally irrelevant grounds.  The distribution of valuable bene-
fits to some groups but not to others on the basis of morally irrelevant
grounds undermines the mutual respect necessary for domestic and
international cooperation.  Like more general approaches to immi-
gration that restrict benefits to certain ethnic groups, this approach
signals to those outside of the privileged group that they are not wor-
132. I spell out why people should be granted citizenship in a particular state by ways
other than descent when I discuss other ways of gaining citizenship.  See infra Part III.B.
133. See supra Part II.B.
134. An example is pre-1999 German citizenship law that made access to citizenship a
matter of right for “ethnic Germans” regardless of their need or their actual connection to
the German political community. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. R
135. See generally Sangiovanni, supra note 102 (discussing the importance of sharing in a R
system based on reciprocity).
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thy of equal concern and respect.  This directly results from basing
citizenship on ethnicity because, unlike other grounds for admission
to citizenship, the strong conception of jus sanguinis is based on some-
thing people cannot change.
The principle may be muted in special, essentially remedial,
cases.  For example, a state may be justified in giving special access to
citizenship to members of certain ethnic groups to make up for past
injustices or to help protect against ongoing ethnic-based harms.  The
easy access that Jewish people have to citizenship in Israel might be
justified on these grounds,136  as might the grant of citizenship to eth-
nic Germans expelled from Eastern European countries after the end
of the Second World War,137 and, somewhat more doubtfully, as
might the easy access to citizenship given by Ireland to those of Irish
descent.138  Such policies, however, are truly remedial; that is, they
should be limited in duration to the time necessary to fulfill the spe-
cial purpose and should not be the sole way, or essentially the sole
way, to gain access to citizenship.
2. A More Limited Jus Sanguinis
Despite my criticisms of the strong version of jus sanguinis, a more
limited version of the principle plays an important role in a just liberal
citizenship policy.  The most basic statement of the position is that
children should inherit the citizenship of their parents.  There are
136. See Ofrit Liviatan, Judicial Activism and Religion-Based Tensions in India and Israel, 26
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 583, 605 (2009) (noting that “the unique legal construction of the
Law of Return [of] 1950 and the Nationality Law [of] 1952” has “provid[ed] for the exclu-
sive right of Jews to immigrate to Israel and automatically acquire Israeli citizenship”).
137. See Karen Y. Crabbs, Resurgence of Nazism in Germany—An Attitude Problem, 8 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 33, 38 (1993) (noting that “‘people of German ethnic origin’ (i.e., children born
in Germany with two native German parents or native Germans who were forced to flee the
country after World War II”) are “entitle[d] . . . to citizenship” in Germany).
138. David Byrne, An Irish View of the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement: The Interaction of
Law and Politics, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1206, 1218 n.31 (1999) (stating that “the Irish
Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1956 set[s] out the legal basis of acquisition of citizen-
ship . . . and on the basis of descent”); see also Thomas M. Franck, Community Based on
Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 41, 45 (1997) (noting that “Americans of Irish de-
scent . . . have been known to recover their ancestral citizenship in order to use the shorter
‘European Union’ line at continental passport control stations, or to give their children
the opportunity in the future to work in Paris”).  The Irish case, in my opinion, is the least
plausible since the harm (namely, colonial oppression by the British) was long gone, most
of those who benefited from the law had perfectly decent places to live, and there was no
serious risk of future harm.  Importantly, these remedial rights do not, at least by them-
selves, imply a right to limit citizenship to the group seeking assistance.  So, even if the
German and Israeli programs of giving special benefit were just, the correlated refusal to
give fair access to citizenship to nongroup members would, at least, require a distinct justi-
fication, which seems to be lacking.
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potential limitations to this principle, but first, I explain why this ver-
sion of the principle is important.  First, children should inherit the
citizenship of their parents because otherwise some individuals born
in a state in which their parents do not have citizenship and in a situa-
tion in which birth in the state does not confer citizenship would be
stateless.139  All states have a duty to prevent statelessness.140  One way
to fulfill this duty is to ensure that children inherit the citizenship of
their parents, thereby assuring that all children have access to citizen-
ship in at least one state.141
Second, and more fundamentally, children should inherit the cit-
izenship of their parents because it is essential to orderly family life.  If
children do not inherit the citizenship of their parents, then in some
cases, the right of parents and children to live together will be in jeop-
ardy.142  We might see this as the most immediate embodiment of the
right to form a family that is provided and protected by the practice of
family based immigration.143  In the case of natural born children,
139. See Lisa Napoli, The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of Colonized People: The
Case of Puerto Rico, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 189 (1998) (noting that “a person born
in a country whose nationality law is [jus] sanguinis of parents from a country whose law of
nationality is jus soli will . . . be stateless”).
140. See generally, e.g., Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 1, Aug. 30, 1961,
989 U.N.T.S. 175 (requiring contracting states to grant nationality to any “person born in
its territory who would otherwise be stateless”).  Of course, only states that are party to this
convention are legally bound by it, but I contend that all states have a moral duty to pre-
vent statelessness as a condition on their right to limit access to citizenship in other ways.
141. A real-life example of this policy is the so-called “guest workers” policy in Germany.
Children (and grandchildren, eventually) born to first generation “guest-workers” did not
have access to citizenship in Germany and would have been stateless were they not given
Turkish (or other) citizenship by their parents.  For a discussion on the history of “guest
workers” in Germany and the current law governing migrant workers in Germany, see
generally Christoph Gyo, Migrant Workers in Germany, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 47
(2009).  This example might make us think that this phenomenon is only a problem for
nonideal theory.  To a degree, it is, since this sort of situation would not arise, at least not
in large numbers, if all states were just (in the sense that they followed the theory outlined
in this Article).  Similarly, we might think that the bad acts of some cannot create positive
duties for others.  This is not simply nonideal theory because each state must ask what is
required of it in the situation in which it is likely to find itself, and liberal states may not,
without committing further injustice, insist that all states meet the requirements of liberal
principles of justice.  So, even if such a rule has little practical effect in an ideal world, it
remains plausible that it is a general requirement of justice.
142. See generally, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 9, Nov.
20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (requiring contracting parties to “ensure that a child shall not be
separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities . . .
determine . . . that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child”).
143. For the U.S. law on family based immigration, see Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1153(a) (2006).  For a discussion of family based
immigration, see Matthew Lister, Immigration, Association, and the Family, 29 L. & PHIL. 717
(2010).
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however, the right to membership applies immediately without an appli-
cation process.144
The general rule that children should inherit their parents’ citi-
zenship may be qualified in some ways but not in others.  To start with
my second claim, states may not restrict the right to citizenship only to
mothers or fathers.  Both sorts of limits have some historical prece-
dent.145  But, such restrictions are illegitimate (for reasons that hardly
need to be spelled out) when categorical or imposed so as to make
acquisition of citizenship very difficult.
To prevent its reach from becoming indefinite, the rule that a
child should inherit his parents’ citizenship may be qualified.  Many
144. See, e.g., SPIRO, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that “there’s no application process” for R
natural-born American citizens).  Note, however, that the converse rule does not hold.
That is, parents need not be automatically granted access to any citizenship to which their
children have a right.  Cases like this arise when citizenship is granted, as I argue it should
be, on the basis of a version of the jus soli principle.  But, granting parents immediate
access to any citizenship held by children to their parents would provide perverse incen-
tives for noncitizens to have children in a particular country.  It is for this reason that most
countries have a rule similar to the American rule, which does not allow U.S. citizen chil-
dren to file a petition for their parents for permanent resident status for their parents until
they have reached twenty-one years of age. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (“[T]he term
‘immediate relatives’ means the children, spouses, and parents of a U.S. citizen, except
that, in the case of parents, such citizens shall be at least 21 years of age.”).  In my article,
Immigration, Association, and the Family, I argue that a just immigration policy requires a
family based immigration provision, at least for immediate family members. See generally
Lister, supra note 143; see also Matthew Lister, A Rawlsian Argument for Extending Family-Based R
Immigration Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 745, 763–72 (2007) (positing
“that Rawlsians should accept, and even require, the granting of family-based immigration
benefits”).
145. For example, until 1934, citizenship in the United States was transferred by jus
sanguinis only via U.S. citizen fathers and not mothers, so that a child born outside the
United States to a U.S. citizen father and noncitizen mother became a U.S. citizen while
U.S. citizen mothers who had a child abroad with a noncitizen father could not transfer
their citizenship to their children.  In a case that allowed the 1934 immigration amend-
ment to apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the old
rule violated modern standards of equal protection. See Wauchope v. U.S. Dep’t of State,
985 F.2d 1407, 1418 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that the old law constituted “impermissible
gender-based discrimination” and requiring the district court to redress that discrimina-
tion “by extending to citizen mothers the same rights as those possessed by citizen fa-
thers”).  The Ninth Circuit’s decision was later codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(h).
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416,
§ 101, 108 Stat. 4305, 4306 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(h)).  Discrimination
against fathers, however, persists in U.S. law.  While citizenship now flows automatically to
the child of a U.S. citizen mother born abroad even if the child is born out of wedlock, a
U.S. citizen father who has a child out of wedlock with a noncitizen abroad must take
several steps before the child’s eighteenth birthday to ensure that his citizenship flows to
his child. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (upholding
Section 1409).  For a useful discussion on “gender equality” in the context of nationality,
see Karen Knop, Relational Nationality: On Gender and Nationality in International Law, in
CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES, supra note 125, at 89, 89–118. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR106.txt unknown Seq: 30 14-DEC-10 14:45
204 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:175
states currently have such rules.  An example is a rule that denies citi-
zenship to the child of a citizen born outside of the country of his
citizenship who has not availed himself of the protection of his coun-
try of citizenship by a certain age (or a combination of age and time
after the birth of the child in question).146  This result is un-
problematic, at least when it does not result in statelessness, as the
justifications for granting jus sanguinis citizenship discussed above no
longer hold true; the child in question has citizenship in the country
of his birth and has access to the state that provides the cultural con-
text for his parents.  Further, states may legitimately worry that ex-
tending jus sanguinis beyond the first foreign-born generation would
dilute the value of citizenship by extending citizenship to people who
have no social ties to, and who do not engage in social cooperation
with, the state in question.147
Such a rule is also connected to the limits placed on the strong
form of jus sanguinis that I argued against above.  In fact, these limita-
tions help explain why we place restrictions on the strong form of jus
sanguinis.  As we might expect from the discussion of the strong prin-
ciple, the exact limits that a state may or should set on a weaker jus
sanguinis principle are not the sorts of limits that derive from philo-
sophical considerations.  Rather, the proper extent of the jus sanguinis
principle for any particular state will depend heavily on the history of
the state and its people, as well as on their culture and other historical
considerations.148  In these ways, states may negotiate the features of
jus sanguinis citizenship without falling into the false and pernicious
view that equates citizenship with ethnicity.
146. So, if Parent X, a citizen of S, has a child, Y, outside of S, and Y never lives in or
avails himself of the protection of S, Y’s child Z, also born outside of S, would not inherit
citizenship in S through Y.  The United States has a rule somewhat like the one discussed.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).
147. See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Pol-
ity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 253 (1999) (stating that Israel limits “acquisition of citizen-
ship [jus] sanguinis outside the state . . . to one generation only”); see also Sasha Baglay,
Book Review, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 155 (2009) (reviewing AYELET SHACHAR, THE
BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009)) (recognizing that “[j]us
sanguinis allows the conferral of citizenship on persons who reside abroad and potentially
have little meaningful connection to the country of their citizenship”).
148. Cf., e.g., Ragini Shah, Sharing the American Dream: Towards Formalizing the Status of
Long-Term Resident Undocumented Children in the United States, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
637, 648 (noting that American “jus sanguinis embodies a number of policy considerations,
including the continuity of families, re-enforcement of a family’s political stake in the fu-
ture of the United States, and ensuring a family’s cultural socialization in the United
States”).
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B. Jus Soli
Citizenship is also commonly acquired by jus soli, or location of
birth.  The large majority of states have some version of this rule,149
with Japan as perhaps the most notable exception.  (For many years,
Germany did not have such a rule, but the country changed its citizen-
ship law in 1999 to institute a limited form of jus soli.150)  Some ver-
sion of this rule is required by considerations of justice in liberal
states, but the rule need not be quite as strong as the version em-
ployed in the United States.  (Considerations of administrative effi-
ciency, however, might well push weaker rules toward more
categorical applications.)
During this discussion, I argue against the claim recently argued
most strongly by Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith that the jus soli rule,
at least in any moderately strong form, violates a basic liberal principle
of justice—the idea that membership in a society should be deter-
mined by the consent of the society’s members.151  I show that, at least
in the sense considered by Schuck and Smith, consent is not a rele-
vant liberal principle; so, although jus soli makes membership depen-
dent on something other than the consent of current members, that
fact is not detrimental to the perspective of liberal principles of
justice.
1. “Strong” and “Weak” Jus Soli
Before discussing these issues further, it is worth taking a mo-
ment to clarify the different ways in which the principle of jus soli may
work.  One of the strongest versions of jus soli is found in the United
States and traces its origins to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution, under which anyone born on U.S. territory automatically
gains U.S. citizenship regardless of the status of his parents and
whether any significant time after birth is spent in the country.152  The
149. See SPIRO, supra note 27, at 10–11. R
150. LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 88, at 171. R
151. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 44, at 7, 116–40 (arguing that “the United States R
should” adopt a “consensual membership approach”); see also PETER H. SCHUCK, Consensual
Citizenship, in CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS, supra note 28, at 207–16  (outlining R
flaws in the ascriptive view of citizenship and arguing in favor of a consent-based approach
to citizenship).  Smith has softened his views somewhat over time. See generally, e.g., ROGERS
M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 243–85
(1997).
152. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: “All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This general rule
was affirmed in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898).  Exceptions to the
rule are very narrow—children born to foreign sovereigns or accredited diplomats, chil-
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rule applies without any consideration of conditionality (of the sort to
be discussed later in this Section) and regardless of any other citizen-
ship to which the person may be entitled.153  This is obviously a very
strong version of the rule, perhaps stronger than what is required by
principles of justice, but it aids administrative efficiency, especially
when birth records are well kept (as they are in most places in the
United States).154
Much weaker versions of jus soli, however, are conceivable and
actually implemented by many states.  The weakest version that might
still be recognizable as jus soli, which limits citizenship rights to indi-
viduals born in a state to parents admitted for permanent residence,
makes the grant of citizenship conditional on continued presence in
the state of birth for many years after the birth and requires a renunci-
ation of any other potential citizenship—usually that of his parents—
at the age of eighteen.  Germany’s revised citizenship laws contain
many of these features, though not all of them.155  Exactly which com-
bination of features is required by a fully just system is not likely to be
answered without detailed knowledge of the social, political, and eco-
nomic features of the state or states in question.156
A form of the jus soli principle somewhat stronger than the weak-
est version presented above157 is necessary for justice, at least for the
near future.  It is possible that, in a world made up of fully liberal
states, in which something like Rawls’s “Law of Peoples” is met158 and
in which barriers to movement are very low, the weakest version might
well suffice.  Since such a world is not likely in the near future and is
dren born on foreign public vessels (mostly warships, not commercial ships) while in U.S.
territorial waters, and children born to “alien enemies in hostile occupation of a portion of
U.S. territory.” ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note  3, at 18.   Each of these exceptions is not R
“‘subject to the jurisdiction’” of the United States. See, e.g., id. at 18 n.6 (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV).
153. Cf. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 3, at 32 (describing the jus soli rule in the United R
States as “broad”).
154. See Christine J. Hsieh, Note, American Born Legal Permanent Residents? A Constitutional
Amendment Proposal, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 511, 527 (1998) (acknowledging “claims that dis-
posing of the status quo jus soli system [in the United States] would create an administra-
tive nightmare”).  This point is perhaps too strong, but the worry is significant.
155. See LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 88, at 176–77. R
156. This is partly (though not entirely) the case because considerations of administra-
tive efficiency, in some circumstances, may give rise to considerations of justice in others.
For example, if many people would risk being made stateless by a particular rule, that rule
would be unacceptable, but if statelessness was not a concern, such a rule might be within
the bounds of justice.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 155–56. R
158. That is, that the world is just. See generally RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 13. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR106.txt unknown Seq: 33 14-DEC-10 14:45
2010] CITIZENSHIP 207
arguably more than liberal peoples can reasonably hope for, I do not
spend any more time on the possibility.
The version of the jus soli principle that I argue is required by
liberal principles of justice, at least in any world in which we are likely
to achieve in the near future, requires that citizenship be granted to
anyone born in a state who spends any significant amount of time in
the state—who “avails” himself of the good provided by the state—
before the age of maturity.  This applies, with only a few special excep-
tions, to anyone born in a particular state regardless of the legal status
of his parents.  This approach would be weaker, however, than the
current U.S. rule because someone merely born in a state, who leaves
at a very young age and who is entitled to citizenship in another coun-
try (to prevent statelessness), does not “avail” himself of the benefits
of the society of his birth and therefore is not entitled to citizenship.
An example, developed below, may help clarify the case.
This proposal has several practical and theoretical advantages
over the current U.S. rule.  Conceptually, the proposed rule is supe-
rior because it recognizes that there is nothing special about the place
of birth.159  Mere birth in a particular place, if not accompanied by
anything else, is surely not enough to establish the sort of ties that
citizenship is meant to build and to protect.160  Tourists provide per-
haps the clearest examples.  If a tourist gives birth in a particular
country but then almost immediately returns to her home state with
her child, and if the child never returns for any significant period of
time to his state of birth, then it is not clear why that child ought to
have the rights (and duties) of citizenship.  Imagine, similarly, a
French businessman who is transferred to the United States from
France for a short period and brings his pregnant wife.  Suppose the
wife gives birth in the United States and then the whole family returns
to France within a few months and never returns to the United
States.161  Under current law, the child of the businessman would be
entitled to U.S. citizenship while, under my proposed rule, he would
159. See SPIRO, supra note 27, at 9 (noting that “accident of birth is the cornerstone of R
U.S. citizenship law” (emphasis added)).
160. Id. at 10 (“The fact of birthplace [has] become[ ] a happenstance, and persons
sharing birthplace in the United States may in fact share little else.  A citizenship based on
birthplace neither creates nor evidences any necessary bonds among its holders.”).
161. Or, to take a frivolous but real example, Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie chose, for
apparently idiosyncratic reasons, to birth their first natural child in Namibia.  Neither Pitt,
Jolie, or the child has any other significant connection to Namibia nor are any of them
likely to have Namibian culture as a significant part of their life stories.  In such a case, it
seems preposterous to suggest that the child deserves Namibian citizenship as a matter of
justice.
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not be.  Certainly, it seems hard to see why this child should be
granted citizenship in the United States as a matter of justice.162
The above discussion, of course, leaves unanswered how long a
child must stay in the country of birth before we accept that he has
“availed” himself of the benefits of membership and that it would be
unjust to refuse him citizenship.163  Any cutoff date is bound to be at
least somewhat arbitrary.  Further, in a modern society, there is reason
to think that any attempt to implement a fully individualized system,
in which each instance is judged in its own terms, is less likely to be
just than a bright-line rule.164  But, the issue is of significant enough
importance that we should err on the side of caution in establishing a
rule.  This is especially true since potential harm to the state caused by
setting the bar too low is significantly less than the harm faced by an
individual who is wrongly denied citizenship.  My intuition is that a
bar of one year is likely to do as good of a job as any.  So, any child
born in a country, who remains in the country of his birth until the
age of one, should be given the right to citizenship in the country of
his birth.  This cutoff protects almost everyone who needs protec-
tion165 but also rules out obvious cases in which persons lack enough
ties to the country of birth to justify providing them with the duties
and benefits of citizenship.166  Other lines may also be just.  I do not
162. See, e.g., SPIRO, supra note 27, at 10 (“Increased global mobility and the sus- R
tainability of distant ties are rendering place of birth an attenuated marker of life trajec-
tory.  A child born in America may well leave America in childhood, or she may grow up
with a primary attachment to some other community.”).
163. See generally id. at 19–21 (describing a “group of happenstance Americans,” who
enjoy American citizenship “through the accident of birthplace” but lack any “ultimate
community affiliation” with the United States).
164. Larmore explains that:
[S]ystem can prove more desirable than sensitivity for a very important reason.
Whenever the government acts according to publicly known statues and laws that
allow little room for conflicting directives, this gives its actions a predictability that
can be invaluable for those who must make decisions in other areas of society, or
in other branches of government.
See LARMORE, supra note 59, at 40–42 (emphasis omitted). R
165. See, e.g., supra notes 34–35, 139 and accompanying text (providing historical exam- R
ples of problems associated with statelessness).
166. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that birthplace alone rarely con- R
fers such ties).
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claim to have shown that this line is the most plausible,167 but it does
seem to be acceptable and administrable.168
This is not the only rule that is compatible with justice.  A state
might choose to adopt the more generous U.S. rule and, in most
cases, doing so will not be incompatible with justice.169  Doing “more”
than justice requires is always acceptable, as long as it does not cause
other injustices elsewhere in the system.  My theory only establishes a
plausible floor for what justice requires.  States may have good rea-
sons, both moral and administrative, to go above that floor, while in
some particularly difficult or otherwise unusual circumstances, less
may be required.  But, if we can establish a plausible minimum for
what justice requires, then we have accomplished something impor-
tant.  That several states fall below my proposed floor (those states
that do not provide for jus soli citizenship at all being the clearest ex-
amples) helps make this point clear.
167. In conversation, Peter Spiro tells me that he favors a ten-year period of residence
like the one found under current British law. See Hsieh, supra note 154, at 522 (describing R
the British Nationality Act of 1981, which provides that “‘children born in the United
Kingdom who are not British citizens by birth, may now acquire British citizenship by regis-
tration after ten years of continuous stay from birth there’”).  While I do not think that
such a law is obviously unjust, I do think it is likely to be more difficult to administer; there
is also significantly more opportunity for unjust denials of citizenship.  These factors weigh
in favor of a shorter period, though they do not, of course, decisively speak in favor of the
one-year rule I propose.
168. As noted, the single greatest advantage of the cutoff being birth is administrative
efficiency. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.  If the rule I propose proves to be R
extremely difficult to administer—perhaps because there are a large number of disputed
cases in which it is not clear if the person in question left his country of birth before the
age of one and did not return, and in which competent evidence did not decide the mat-
ter—then justice might call for the use of birth as the rule.  Deciding such issues, however,
is outside the scope of this Article.
169. Cases in which the American rule might be incompatible with justice are more
imaginative than actual.  Suppose state X, as a matter of justly decided policy, chooses to
limit its population growth, but uses the American rule of jus soli and allows for short-term
visits, as liberal states should.  (Because there is no plausible reason to rule out short-term
visits in most cases and because doing so would likely be offensive to other states and
detrimental to current citizens, liberal states have a strong presupposition in favor of al-
lowing short-term visits by foreigners.)  Suppose a neighboring state, Y, has high popula-
tion growth and encourages its citizens to give birth in state X when possible so as to
provide an “escape valve” if the population in state Y is too high, since citizens born in X
could leave overcrowded Y for X.  In such a case, the American rule would allow Y to
perpetrate an injustice on X by undermining X’s ability to engage in self-determination.
Cases like this are likely to be rare, though, if they exist at all.  For a very good discussion of
the importance of self-determination and how it might be undermined by outside actions,
including immigration, see MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 80, at 71–74. R
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2. Responding to the Consent Challenge
A more detailed argument for my position is best made in the
course of defending it against a set of related challenges to the jus soli
principle in general.  Although these challenges are quite old,170 they
remain common.  These theories hold that membership in a liberal
society must be based on the consent of all members to be legiti-
mate.171  In these accounts, consent is necessary and sufficient for
membership.172  Those proposing such a position claim that any
strong form of jus soli violates the consent principle because it re-
quires granting membership to some individuals without the consent
of current members.173  This argument is made most clear by the ex-
ample of children of illegal immigrants,174 but the logic of the posi-
tion is not limited to such cases.  Rather, the consent principle implies
that a state may set rules for admission to citizenship in almost any way
so long as all current members consent.175
The consent principle purports to trace its origins back to John
Locke’s version of social contract theory.176  Since much of the argu-
170. See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 44, at 10–11 (describing the historical R
“antecedents” of “[t]he principle of consent”).
171. SCHUCK, supra note 151, at 207 (explaining that “[t]he principle of consent” “holds R
that political membership can result only from free individual choices”).
172. See id. (“[T]he circumstances of one’s origins may of course influence one’s prefer-
ences for political affiliation, but they are not determinative.”).
173. See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 44, at 30–31 (noting that many scholars R
argue that “consent to membership must . . . be mutual, granted by the representatives of
the existing citizenry as well as by the prospective citizen”).
174. Id. at 94 (“If mutual consent is the irreducible condition of membership in the
American polity, it is difficult to defend a practice that extends birthright citizenship to the
native-born children of illegal aliens.”); see also SCHUCK, supra note 151, at 208 (noting that R
“ascription significantly constrains governmental control over membership and can com-
pel the state to provide protection to those, most notably illegal aliens, whose entrance into
the country it has actively endeavored to prevent”).
175. Liberals (as opposed to at least some forms of libertarians) will insist that other
principles of justice limit what members may consent to, so that, for example, a state may
not offer citizenship to the children of current noncitizens on the condition that the
noncitizens work as slaves. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, The Transformation of Immigration
Law, in CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS, supra note 28, at 19, 24 (“Liberalism . . . R
does not merely affirm the primacy of individual consent as the bedrock of political and
juridical relationships.  It also locates fundamental legal rights in individuals by reason of
their universal humanity and without regard to contingencies of their status or condi-
tion.”).   Libertarians who think that freedom of contract is a basic right would reject even
this sort of limit.  This is one of the ways in which libertarianism differs from liberalism. See
Samuel Freeman, Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 105, 131–32 (2002).  One of the issues raised here is whether some form of the
jus soli principle is, as I contend, one of the principles of justice with which any other
agreement between citizens and noncitizens must be compatible.
176. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 348–51 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1964) (1690).  For a contemporary Lockean approach that insists
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ment in this Article is set in contractarian177 terms, it is especially im-
portant that I show what is wrong with the consent position.  Locke
did not discuss this particular issue in his Second Treatise, giving only a
sketchy account of joining consent (as opposed to legitimating con-
sent).178  As a result, I do not give significant time to his account, in
particular, but focus instead on variants more directly on point.
The consent principle that I criticize here is common in the
United States, despite our long tradition of jus soli citizenship. At the
Constitutional Convention, Governor Morris, one of the “founding fa-
thers,” stated that “every [s]ociety from a great nation down to a club
ha[s] the right of declaring the conditions on which new members
should be admitted.”179  The position is also set out strongly by
Charles Kesler, who claims that self-government presupposes a distinct
“national ‘self’”180 and that, in turn, “[a] people [that is, the ‘national
self’] is defined . . . by the unanimous consent of each member.”181
Therefore, Kesler contends, a state or nation (the two coincide on his
account) is rightly analogized, as Governor Morris argued, to a club
that may set whatever membership rules it wishes.182  Further, Kesler
contends that most U.S. citizens actually view their citizenship
through the lens of consent.183
that legitimacy requires actual consent, see generally the works of A. John Simmons, in-
cluding, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (1992) and ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE,
CONSENT, AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIETY (1993).  Simmons’s account, however, is primarily an
account of legitimacy and not membership, and he does not significantly discuss
immigration.
177. “Contractarianism” (or “contractualism”—the technical difference between the two
does not need to be discussed here) is a family of views in moral and political philosophy
that seeks to use the idea of an agreement, often put in terms of a “social” contract, to
illustrate and explain important ideas about morality, legitimacy, or justice.  Although early
versions of contractarianism can be traced as far back as Plato’s Republic, the modern ver-
sions of the view derive from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.  In this Article, I most closely
follow the version developed by Rawls, although I believe that accepting most of my argu-
ments does not require accepting Rawls’s entire framework.   For a discussion of Rawls’s
relationship to the contractarian tradition, see SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 14–21 (2007).
178. Locke discusses the “origins” of political society in the Second Treatise, but his ac-
count does not describe the situation of someone seeking to join an existing society. See
LOCKE, supra note 176, at 285, 349–51.  Locke discusses how consent legitimates the power R
of government, but he has very little to say about an “outsider” joining an existing govern-
ment. See id. at 364–67.
179. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 237–38 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1966).
180. Charles R. Kesler, The Promise of American Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZEN-
SHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 107, at 3, 22. R
181. Id. at 15.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 16.
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Kesler’s last point is questionable since it is unlikely that many
people conceive of anything that can properly be called a “theory of
citizenship.”  Regardless, the view that jus soli is incompatible with lib-
eralism has many other supporters.  Elizabeth Cohen, for example,
argues that jus soli, in any form, is incompatible with liberalism for two
reasons.  First, it “ascrib[es] citizenship to persons” in a way that “is
almost entirely arbitrary.”184  Second, it “deprives both the community
and the individual [gaining citizenship] of the opportunity to come to
reasoned conclusions about membership.”185  I deal with Cohen’s first
concern more explicitly later186 (although my quick discussion above
gives some reason to think her claim is false).
For now, I wish to focus on the second issue—Cohen’s claim that
consent is a necessary feature of citizenship.  Peter Schuck and Rogers
Smith have defended this view at great length.  I focus on Schuck’s
version of the argument, although he presents his view as an argu-
ment developed with Smith.  According to Schuck’s account, which
he explicitly relates back to Locke,187 mutual and actual consent be-
tween members (and any would-be members) is essential to any prop-
erly liberal view of justice and citizenship; it is also characteristic of
U.S. practice.188  Though both claims seem wrong, I focus only on the
first claim to any great deal.
Actual consent may be either express or tacit.189  It is clear that
express consent to membership—an actual and explicit agreement
among all citizens that they will be citizens and will extend citizenship
rights to each other—does not and probably could not exist on any
large scale.190  So, if actual consent is to play a normative role in this
184. Elizabeth F. Cohen, Carved from the Inside Out: Immigration and America’s Public Philos-
ophy of Citizenship, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 32, 41 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007).
185. Id.
186. See infra text accompanying note 208. R
187. SCHUCK, supra note 151, at 209. R
188. Id. at 210, 212.
189. For a discussion of tacit consent, see generally A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES
AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 75–100 (1979).
190. Id. at 79 (noting that “[t]he paucity of express consentors is painfully apparent”).
Schuck and Smith argue that express consent to the American system was given by the
people through their Representatives in Congress. See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra
note 44, at 74–89 (outlining the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Citi- R
zenship Clause).  This is implausible, even for those alive at the time of the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment; most of the Representatives in Congress were elected without any
indication that the Fourteenth Amendment would be passed.  Further, general features of
representative government weigh against such a conclusion.  It might make sense to sug-
gest that the governed consent to whatever their Representatives enact, but if this is the
case, individuals will rarely actually consent to any individual piece of legislation—either
because their favored candidate did not win the election or because their Representative is
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discourse, it must be as tacit consent.191  But, there are reasons why
tacit consent cannot play this role.  Arguments made by David Hume
more than two hundred years ago remain decisive: Actual consent is
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish political obligations or to
provide justification for the sort of consent that might ground citizen-
ship.192  The circumstances in which people find themselves—born
into a society, usually raised in it, and commonly without a concrete
right to go to any other particular country—Hume argued, are such
that “consent” is not a meaningful factor.193  It cannot, therefore, be
the ground for our relationships of state membership.194  Thus, the
weakness of Schuck’s argument is already apparent from conclusions
over two hundred years old.  It is worth, however, looking at some of
the details of Schuck’s view to explore more fully why it is incorrect
and to consider how a more modern contractarian view can avoid
these drawbacks.
Schuck, like many others, is particularly worried about illegal
aliens.195  The presence of illegal aliens threatens to devalue citizen-
ship, he claims.196  Despite what Schuck sometimes seems to imply,
the consent view of citizenship does not have anything to say about
illegal aliens as such.197  Whether immigrants of any sort, illegal or
not, gain citizenship is a question of naturalization policy,198 and con-
sent theory, as presented by and of interest to Schuck, is not a theory
of naturalization but an attack on the jus soli principle.199  The issue,
then, is not with illegal immigrants but with the children of illegal im-
migrants born in the United States.  It is these people who Smith,
in opposition to the measure.  Actual consent to “the system” would be just another fiction.
Furthermore, even if these difficulties could be resolved, Schuck and Smith’s account is
completely opaque as to why consent is binding on future generations, none of whom
consented in any meaningful way to what was done by Representatives acting long before
they were born.  This approach is therefore hopeless.
191. Cf. SIMMONS, supra note 189, at 79 (“[T]he real battleground for consent theory is R
generally admitted to be the notion of tacit consent.”).
192. See generally, e.g., DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL,
AND LITERARY 465, 465–87 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 1985) (1741).
193. Id. at 475.
194. See id.
195. See SCHUCK, supra note 151, at 212. R
196. See, e.g., text accompanying note 45. R
197. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 151, at 214 (claiming that jus soli principles “reward R
lawbreaking”).  The only possible “lawbreaker” here is the illegal alien parent.  The illegal
alien parent, however, is not a possible focus of an argument about jus soli citizenship and
consent.
198. See supra note 5 (defining naturalization). R
199. See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 44, at 22 (explaining that early consensual R
theories were motivated by a desire “to challenge absolutist views” and to reevaluate “how
the circumstances of birth defined one’s political membership”).
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Schuck, Cohen, and others would exclude from citizenship.200
Schuck’s view gains its (limited) plausibility by constantly (and illic-
itly) shifting between considerations of illegal immigrants and their
children, which allows Schuck to claim that the jus soli principle allows
“outsiders [to] possess the power to transform themselves into insiders
without the nation’s consent.”201  The only obvious outsiders here are
the noncitizen parents of children born in a state, and a jus soli rule
does not, at least on its own, say anything about whether they are eligi-
ble for citizenship, or even immigrant status, at all.202
What about the children of illegal immigrants?  Are they not “out-
siders” who, by the jus soli principle, force insiders to treat them as
fellow insiders without their consent?  This is a dubious and confused
view.  First, the children of illegal aliens are, from a moral perspective,
just like any other child born in a particular state—all just find them-
selves there.203  The status of the parents is simply irrelevant to the
200. See supra note 174. See generally SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 44, at 91 (“Perhaps R
most important, the inclusiveness of the birthright citizenship rule . . . has the effect today
of removing a legal disability that would otherwise afflict many children of illegal aliens.”).
201. SCHUCK, supra note 45, at 178. R
202. Recall that in the United States, the noncitizen parents of a U.S. citizen are only
eligible to gain immigrant status from this relationship after the citizen child reaches the
age of twenty-one. See supra note 144.  The parent must then wait at least five more addi- R
tional years to naturalize.  INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1) (2006).  Considerations of justice do
not strictly require this rule, and it may be statutorily changed.  Schuck’s constant shifting
between discussions of the children of illegal immigrants and their parents (the illegal
immigrants themselves) is one of the most frustrating, almost dishonest, aspects of his
book.  For example, he claims that we should not interpret the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to establish a jus soli principle because so doing would “reward
lawbreaking.” SCHUCK, supra note 151, at 214.  But, again, the people who are granted R
citizenship by such a jus soli principle are the children born here, and they are not, in any
plausible sense, “lawbreakers.”  This must be clear to Schuck.  I can only assume that he
shifts between discussing the parents and the children because it is necessary to gain rhe-
torical force for his position, which rests on otherwise faulty foundations.
203. See HUME, supra note 192, at 476 (“Did one generation of men go off the stage at R
once, and another succeed, as is the case with silk-worms and butter-flies, the new race, if
they had sense enough to choose their government . . . , might voluntarily, and by general
consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or prece-
dents, which prevailed among their ancestors.  But as human society is in perpetual flux,
one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in order
to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves to the
established constitution . . . .”); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 41 (“We R
have no prior identity before being in society: it is not as if we came from somewhere but
rather we find ourselves growing up in this society in this social position, with its attendant
advantages and disadvantages, as our good or ill fortune would have it.”); RAWLS, THEORY
OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 12 (“No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation R
which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in
some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materi-
ally affects his life prospects.”).  Each of these descriptions fits the children of illegal immi-
grants born into a society just as much as they fit the children of citizens.
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moral status of the child.  To hold otherwise is not to take a consent
view but to take the very view that proponents of the consent view
oppose—an ascriptive view that assigns status to a child based on mor-
ally irrelevant grounds.204  It is the supposed “consent” view, however,
that threatens to make citizenship a caste-like structure while the jus
soli principle prevents this from occurring, despite what Schuck,
Smith, Cohen, and others have argued.
We see this more fully when we look at the more plausible con-
tractarian view presented by Rawls.  Here, the idea of actual consent is
replaced by a new idea—hypothetical consent in the original posi-
tion.205  Parties in the original position do not know their place in
society or that of their parents.206  They also (notoriously) take them-
selves to be born into a society and develop rules based on that as-
sumption.207  I contend, however, that when people in the original
position develop rules for citizenship (assumedly in the constitutional
and legislative stages), they will adopt a rule of jus soli; no other rule
guarantees that all who enter a society by birth have equal rights.
Once again, we see that, far from being in conflict with liberal princi-
ples, a rule of jus soli is necessary to protect and to ensure such
principles.
The next step is to show how Cohen’s first argument—that the
jus soli principle ascribes membership on morally irrelevant
grounds208—is mistaken.  Consider again the necessary features of the
jus soli principle I have advanced.  Under this principle, citizenship
must, at least, be granted to anyone who is born in a state and who
204. SCHUCK, supra note 151, at 207 (“In its purest form, the principle of ascription R
holds that one’s political membership is entirely and irrevocably determined by some ob-
jective circumstance—in this case, birth within a particular sovereign’s allegiance or juris-
diction.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Cohen, supra note 184, at 44 (arguing that the R
reason “we have such a well-articulated public understanding of citizenship that fails to
answer basic questions about borders” is “that the jurisprudence out of which American
citizenship was established was one that did not take up questions of immigration,” but
instead “adopt[ed] ascriptive jus soli in a confined manner that does not apply univer-
sally”).  Bernadette Meyler, working from a historical perspective rather than a philosophi-
cal one, also argues that the logic of Schuck and Smith’s approach leads them to an
essentially ascriptive account of citizenship, despite their stated opposition to this. See Mey-
ler, supra note 44, at 558–59. R
205. For a summary of Rawls’s “original position,” see RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM,
supra note 22, at 304–10. R
206. See id. at 305 (noting that the original position’s “‘veil of ignorance’ means that the
parties do not know the social position, or the conception of the good (its particular aims
and attachments), or the realized abilities and psychological propensities, and much else,
of the persons they represent”).
207. See id. at 40–41 (stating that because “entry into” a democratic society “is only by
birth,” “[w]e have no prior identity before being in society”).
208. See supra text accompanying note 184. R
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lives in the state long enough to have “availed” himself of the protec-
tion and of the goods that the state provides.  This includes childhood
socialization.  Having been born into and raised in a society is the
primary method by which one gains a culture; access to a culture, es-
pecially access to the culture in which one is born and raised, is argua-
bly an extremely important good.209  It is only a jus soli principle, at
least of the weak sort I have defended here, that ensures the right to
this good.  Therefore, once again the jus soli rule does not distribute
goods in a way that is morally irrelevant, but in a way that is necessary
to prevent a morally irrelevant distribution of goods.
Finally, it is important to see that a jus soli rule need not have the
negative “ascriptive” aspects attributed to it by Schuck, Cohen, Smith,
and others.  Such a contention confuses historical fact with concep-
tual necessity.  Schuck, Cohen, and Smith all note that the jus soli prin-
ciple developed out of the rule in Calvin’s Case, which was decided by
Sir Edward Coke.210  This rule held that citizenship was determined by
birth and was not changeable; it could not be alienated.211  Although
this inalienability was historically a part of jus soli, it is no longer a
necessary part of the rule and to think otherwise is to engage in a
massive non sequitur.  In fact, many modern societies manage to mix
jus soli rules with the rights to emigrate and to alienate one’s citizen-
ship.212  The fact that the jus soli principle was once paired with an
illiberal ascriptive notion of citizenship—one tied up with (British)
imperialism213—is interesting historically but carries no significant
normative force.  It is difficult to see, then, how Cohen’s argument is
209. Although states and “societies” do not perfectly overlap, the overlap is significant,
and the political structure of the state is, to some degree, necessary for societies to persist
over time.  For discussion of this point and others made in this Section, see generally KYM-
LICKA, supra note 11, at 82–93 (1995).  I do not, however, endorse all aspects of Kymlicka’s R
account, and I especially take issue with his association of societies with “nations” and his
rejection of a civic notion of citizenship.
210. Calvin v. Smith (Calvin’s Case), 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1608). For particularly use-
ful descriptions of Calvin’s Case, see Cohen, supra note 184, at 40–45, and Meyler, supra R
note 44, at 550. R
211. SMITH, supra note 151, at 45 (“As God’s will and natural law were perfect, eternal, R
and immutable, one’s natural subjectship was unalterable by anyone short of God Him-
self.”).  This is what Cohen has in mind when she states that jus soli limits both sides in a
would-be membership negotiation; it is also what she means when she claims that jus soli
was one of the principles vigorously opposed by the colonists before and during the Ameri-
can Revolution. See Cohen, supra note 184 (arguing that citizenship based on jus soli “de- R
prives both the community and the individual of the opportunity to come to reasoned
conclusions about membership”).
212. In the Expatriation Act of 1868, for example, the United States declared that “the
right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people.”  Act of July 27, 1868, ch.
249, 15 Stat. 223, 223.
213. Cohen, supra note 184, at 40–45. R
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persuasive.  In light of these considerations, we have no good reason
to reject a sensible jus soli rule, and we have significant reason to in-
corporate such a rule as part of our citizenship policy.
3. Contra Shachar
Before discussing naturalization, I wish to address one other chal-
lenge to the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles.  Ayelet Shachar has
recently challenged systems of “birthright” citizenship, a category that
seems, on her account, to include aspects of both the jus soli and jus
sanguinis approaches, on the ground that they perpetuate inequality
and are acceptable only if we think that persistent inequalities of
wealth and opportunity are justified on ascriptive grounds.214  Addi-
tionally, Shachar worries that the very idea of citizenship may be un-
just because it implies that those “inside” a state are able to make
choices that affect those “outside” a state without the outsiders having
a say in the matter.215
Shachar’s worries must be taken seriously by anyone committed
to modest cosmopolitanism.  It is far from clear, however, that a radi-
cal reformation of the very idea of citizenship, as called for by
Shachar,216 is the right approach.  First, recall that citizenship, in this
Article, is not “ascriptive” in any objectionable sense.  It is not tied to
ethnic membership, nor is it immutable, since the obligations that it
imposes may, at least in some circumstances, be shed.  Next, recall
that our general modest cosmopolitan view places limits on the sorts
of inequalities that are acceptable between states.217  While this view
does not call for the same degree of equality between states as within
them, it does hold that certain inequalities are unjust.  These unjust
inequalities cannot be justified on the basis of the system of citizen-
ship outlined in this Article—they cannot be justified at all.  As Sarah
Song puts it, “The question of the acceptability of a state’s member-
ship rule has to be separated from the normative grounds for global
redistribution.”218  This shows only that the acceptability of a state’s
214. See Ayelet Shachar, Against Birthright Privilege: Redefining Citizenship as Property, in
IDENTITIES, AFFILIATIONS, AND ALLEGIANCES 257, 261 (Seyla Benhabib et al. eds., 2007).
215. Id. at 264.
216. Id. at 261.  For a full account of Shachar’s thoughts on how citizenship should be
reformed, see generally SHACHAR, supra note 147.  Because the details of her reform pro- R
ject are not directly relevant for the issue I am concerned with here, I do not discuss them.
217. See MANDLE, supra note 17, at 102–24 (developing a modest cosmopolitan account R
of distributive duties between states).
218. Sarah Song, Rethinking Citizenship Through Alienage and Birthright Privilege, ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 12) (on file with the Maryland Law
Review).
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membership rule is independent of the notion of “birthright” citizen-
ship, at least when properly conceived and put within a modest cos-
mopolitan framework.  The attempt to derive redistribution through
discussion of birthright citizenship turns out to be a needless shuffle.
Shachar’s other concern has a similar solution.  It is true that the
very notion of citizenship implies that “insiders” (citizens) are able to
make decisions that affect “outsiders” (noncitizens) who have no, or
limited, say in the matter.219  But, this is not necessarily unjust.  Any
type of association, and every type of decision making, even by an indi-
vidual person, has this result.  For example, decisions made within a
family will affect nonfamily members, and many decisions I make as
an autonomous individual will affect others who had no right to a say
in my decision.  This shows that the mere fact that some who had no
right to a say in a decision are affected by that decision cannot then
make a system that allows such decision making problematic.  Rather,
we must look at cases where those affected are unjustly affected.  Here,
again, there is nothing special about citizenship. No practice of citi-
zenship makes it acceptable to unjustly affect outsiders.  On my ac-
count, what determines which effects are unjust is not the theory of
citizenship per se but the modest cosmopolitan view in which the the-
ory is embedded.  Shachar accepts this argument, conceding that
ideas of “world citizenship” and open borders are not plausible alter-
natives.220  Her worries, it seems, are worries about the types of inter-
national duties we have, rather than worries about “birthright
citizenship” as such.  I suspect that Shachar would want international
duties to be stronger than those called for by modest cosmopolitan-
ism; this—and not as to citizenship—is where our accounts differ.
IV. NATURALIZATION AND ALIENAGE LAW
Last, I discuss naturalization policy and alienage law, or the area
of law that relates to the rights and duties of noncitizens.221  States
may impose only fairly modest limits on naturalization, these limits
must be neutral among different conceptions of the good, and they
must be enforced in a regular, uniform way.  Moreover, despite the
above requirements, states have a modest amount of room in which to
219. See Shachar, supra note 214, at 264. R
220. Id. at 269–70.
221. Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration,
86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1581 (2008) (“Alienage law . . . define[s] the rights and obligations of
noncitizens within the United States.”).  I largely ignore the question of what rules should
apply to nonimmigrant foreigners, including guest workers.  This is a difficult and impor-
tant question, but one I avoid for the sake of space.  I hope to return to it in the future.
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treat citizens and noncitizens differently without violating the de-
mands of justice.  In sum, while naturalization should be open and
easy, states may use alienage law to treat noncitizens differently from
citizens in many substantial areas.
A. Naturalization
While states vary in their requirements for naturalization, all
states have requirements of some sort.222  These requirements serve
two main purposes: They ensure a commitment to the country of im-
migration,223 and they ensure assimilation into the culture of the
country.224  Obviously, the two functions may be linked.  Some will
find the link to be necessary,225 arguing that an immigrant cannot be
sufficiently committed to the state of immigration without being
highly assimilated to that state’s culture.  When such a view is joined
with an approach that ties culture to ethnicity, naturalization is diffi-
cult or even impossible.  The limiting case in this direction is Japan.
Nonethnic Japanese are essentially barred from naturalization and
even ethnic Japanese who are foreign-born must be judged by a review
panel with significant discretion prior to naturalization.226  Before the
reform of its immigration laws in 1999, Germany also had a very
strong ethnic element, although it did allow individuals judged by a
review panel to be sufficiently “Germanized” (depending on various
factors) to naturalize after a residency period of ten to fifteen years.227
The panel held significant discretion in determining whether the ap-
plicant was sufficiently “Germanized.”228
Such systems are deeply problematic from a liberal perspective.
Restrictions on naturalization aimed at cultural preservation are in-
compatible with liberal principles of justice for several reasons.  Most
222. SPIRO, supra note 27, at 33. R
223. See, e.g., id. at 33, 37–40 (noting that American naturalization policy includes
“[d]urational residency requirements” and describing those requirements).
224. Cf. id. at 38 (“One could assume that presence in the United States would (on
average) impart to an individual the distinctive qualities of American life in all its elements,
cultural, historical, social, and political.  Better than any test of specific knowledge, one
could be expected to absorb, through the contacts of everyday life, what it [means] to be
American.”).
225. Noah Pickus seems to take such a view. See, e.g., Noah M.J. Pickus, To Make Natural:
Creating Citizens for the Twenty-First Century, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY, supra note 107, at 107, 107–39.  Pickus calls his position “constitutional R
citizenship.” Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Pickus’s view is quite different,
as will be clear, from the “constitutional patriotism” or the “civic notion of citizenship” I
argued for above. See Part II.B.
226. LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 88, at 195–96. R
227. See id. at 176–77.
228. See id.
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fundamental, such rules place restrictions on full citizenship that out-
siders either cannot meet or that are unreasonable to expect them to
meet.229  These rules cannot form the basis of a scheme of reasonable
and rational cooperation.  If a system of rules is to form the basis for
cooperation, then those who cooperate must be able to meet the sys-
tem’s standards without giving up fundamental rights.  If we assume
that justice requires all states to accept some degree of immigration—
at least some form of family based immigration and perhaps some
refugees230—then there must be some degree of cooperation between
insiders and outsiders regarding access to full membership.  The exact
terms that set the limits on cooperation remain to be spelled out, but
it is elementary that terms that one side cannot meet, or cannot be
expected to meet, cannot be terms of cooperation.
Further, it is clearly unacceptable to impose such requirements
on natural-born citizens.  A society may not, if it hopes to comply with
liberal principles of justice, require that its members have a certain
culture (let alone a certain ethnicity) to be afforded full rights.  To
require otherwise is inevitably to use repressive force against citizens
in a manner that is incompatible with liberalism.  As Rawls points out,
a plurality of conceptions of the good is a permanent feature of life in
a society that rejects oppressive uses of state power to impose a politi-
cal conception of the good.231  Now, it is not the case that a state may
only require of immigrants seeking to naturalize what it may require
of its own citizens, a point I spell out more fully below.  The compari-
son is apt, however, because the conditions considered here are ones
that a would-be citizen could not change or should not be expected to
change out of fundamental fairness to his personality.232  This is in
contrast with the other requirements that I consider below, all of
which an applicant could meet without having to change fundamental
aspects of his personality.
229. For a discussion of the American requirements for naturalization, see SPIRO, supra
note 27, at 34–42. R
230. See supra Part III.A.2.
231. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 36–37; see also Burton Dreben, On R
Rawls and Political Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 68, at R
316, 320–21 (“Rawls holds that not only can you not expect citizens to agree on the same
comprehensive moral doctrine, but also you can not expect citizens to agree on the same
liberal political conception; that would be unreasonable.”).
232. I intentionally draw a parallel with the “social group” ground for an asylum claim
here.  That this same characterization fits with a basis for granting asylum shows that such
conditions cannot be reasonable because they cannot be part of a system of cooperation.
For the U.S. rule in this area, see In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).  For
further discussion on social cooperation and reasonableness, see generally RAWLS, POLITI-
CAL LIBERALISM, supra note 22, at 48–58. R
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The type of diversity about views of the good life discussed here is
seen by some scholars as a threat to citizenship; some argue that citi-
zenship is meaningful only if it is based on membership in an exclu-
sive encompassing group of the sort only a shared culture could
provide.233  From a liberal perspective, this is almost exactly the oppo-
site of correct.  While we might accept that the state is the largest per-
vasive group to which a citizen belongs,234 it is, as Michael Walzer
points out, only when there are other groups within the state to which
a citizen might give allegiance that citizenship can be a moral
choice.235 This moral choice is something that liberals ought to value.
What about naturalization requirements less strenuous than
those described above?  Noah Pickus, among others, argues that the
naturalization process should promote a form of civic nationalism,236
although Pickus’s civic nationalism is tied to what he takes to be par-
ticular American values.237  Unlike the exclusionary models rejected
above, Pickus claims that such policies are necessary to ensure the in-
clusion of would-be immigrants.238  Pickus rejects Linda Bosniak’s
claim that “national solidarity” programs “categorically privilege” in-
233. See, e.g., SPIRO, supra note 27, at 31 (“To the extent that citizenship as a legal status R
no longer reflects distinctive communal bonds, the less meaning will attach to the cate-
gory.”); cf. David Miller, Immigrants, Nations, and Citizenship, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 371, 375
(2008) (“The legitimacy of the modern state derives in part from its role as protector and
promoter of the national culture of its people—if there was no distinct culture to protect,
there would be no reason for the state to exist as an independent entity.”).
234. See MICHAEL WALZER, The Problem of Citizenship, in OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDI-
ENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 203, 218 (1970) (“A citizen, we might say, is a man whose
largest or most inclusive group is the state.”).  Peter Spiro objects to this characterization
on the ground that there are many groups to which people belong that are transnational
in character. SPIRO, supra note 27, at 125–26.  Again, the existence of this type of group is R
not a new phenomenon, so this is not a new problem for citizenship.  And, especially to-
day, these transnational societies are, to a large degree, parasitic on cooperation at the
domestic level and are therefore less fundamental from the perspective important for this
work.
235. WALZER, supra note 234, at 227. R
236. Civic nationalism is, in this case, distinct from what I have called a “civic notion of
citizenship” in that civic nationalism still calls for a homogeneity of political and, to some
degree, moral beliefs.  An example might be the French policy of official state “secular-
ism.”  For a discussion of the difference between Pickus’s “civic nationalism” and some-
thing much more like what I have called a “civic notion of citizenship,” see MU¨LLER, supra
note 62, at 78–80. R
237. It is doubtful that the values Pickus focuses on are “particularly American,” at least
any more. See SPIRO, supra note 27, at 46–50 (explaining that although “American democ- R
racy presented an anomaly in the global political landscape” at “the time of the first natu-
ralization measure,” its “distinctiveness” may no longer be as striking).
238. Pickus, supra note 225, at 133.  According to Pickus: R
[A] single complex sense of constitutional identity is necessary to integrate our
allegiances to the multiple communities to which we belong.  We need citizens
who feel an emotional attachment to the polity, who are committed to its basic
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\70-1\MLR106.txt unknown Seq: 48 14-DEC-10 14:45
222 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:175
siders and are therefore unjust.239  Pickus argues, instead, that such
programs are a requirement of justice, since a shared national identity
is necessary for the legitimacy of the state and thus for justice.240  The
goal of the naturalization process, Pickus claims, should be to “fos-
ter[ ] immigrants’ identification” with the country of naturaliza-
tion.241 If this is not done, Pickus worries, immigration threatens to
destabilize national identity and thereby delegitimize the state.242
The state may, Pickus argues, legitimately promote the adoption
of a national identity through the immigration and naturalization pro-
cess and may seek to bring about a “transformation of consciousness”
in the would-be citizen.243  To do this, the state may impose substan-
tial naturalization requirements.244  As Pickus himself acknowledges,
however, it is hard to know to what such claims (about “transforming
consciousness”) might amount.245  We could replace our largely
empty (though in some ways still problematic) civics and language re-
quirements with mandatory civics classes or even community service.
It is not at all clear, however, that this would even tend toward, let
alone guarantee, the “transformation of consciousness” that Pickus
desires.246  Further, it has long been a basic liberal principle that while
the law may compel outward behavior, it cannot legitimately seek to
peer behind external action and judge the content of our hearts.247
So, it seems that we are left with a choice between formal, but perhaps
values, who share certain qualities and attitudes, and who are willing to interro-
gate those values and deliberate over the meaning of their shared identity.
Id.
239. See Bosniak, see supra note 107. R
240. Pickus, supra note 225, at 109. R
241. Id. at 124.
242. Id. at 113.
243. Id. at 127–29.
244. See, e.g., id. at 130 (“Not all barriers [to naturalization] are harmful. . . .  A naturali-
zation process that treats citizenship as a valued and substantive status gives applicants a
reason to prize their new standing.  Moreover, naturalization requirements can provide
immigrants with valuable educational opportunities that foster their development as full
members of the polity.”).
245. Cf. id. (noting that “[a] more serious naturalization process need not mean fewer
successful applicants”).
246. Id. at 127–29.
247. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 23–24 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797); see also Wolfgang Kersting, Politics, Freedom, and Order:
Kant’s Political Philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY
342, 345 (Paul Guyer ed., 1992) (“Kant’s concept of right concerns only the external
sphere of the freedom of action.  Only the effects of actions on the freedom of action of
others are of interest to it.”).  This does not mean that we cannot have, say, a school system
designed to promote a feeling of civic loyalty.  Properly understood, such a program is
necessary.  But, it does mean that any tests designed toward judging the hearts of immi-
grants must be rejected.
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empty, rules and an illiberal process in which we give officials discre-
tion to judge the hearts of others, seeking to discern their worthiness,
in a way that is arbitrary and capricious.  In light of this problem, and
given the strong reasons liberals have for preferring rules that can be
uniformly enforced, we have strong reason to reject Pickus’s view.248
Additionally, the sort of scheme suggested by Pickus may be un-
necessary to achieve the legitimate aspects of his goals.  If we want new
immigrants to gain our civic ideals, to value those parts of our society
that we think make it particularly valuable, and to cherish the society
as their own, then we should welcome them to participate in civil soci-
ety as equals and on their own terms rather than require them to par-
ticipate as part of the naturalization process.  After all, as Walzer
points out, this is how natural-born citizens come to (or fail to) adopt
these ideals.249
Pickus’s claim that extending rights to noncitizens might keep
them from broader political participation250 is also mistaken.  Al-
lowing as much participation in public life as possible (perhaps in-
cluding the right to take part in the local political process, as is
allowed in several European countries for noncitizens regardless of
nationality and is required by the European Union for E.U. nation-
als251) is instead likely to do much more to foster a sense of civic be-
longing than would the “more substantial” naturalization
requirements favored by Pickus.  Walzer, who notes that native-born
citizens primarily develop their sense of virtue through these
means,252 and Saskia Sassen, who notes that civil society activities such
as “immigrant associations and cultural activities” do not, as Pickus
fears, lead to a balkanized society but assist “integration,” also make
this same point.253
248. For a particularly egregious example of the abuse that can result when discretion is
given to officials to judge “assimilation” when making naturalization decisions, see Katrin
Bennhold, A Veil Closes France’s Door to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2008, at A1.
249. WALZER, supra note 60, at 18. R
250. Pickus, supra note 225, at 116, 118. R
251. This right is guaranteed by the Treaty on the European Union of 1993 (commonly
called The “Maastricht Treaty”). See generally Treaty on European Union of 1993 art. 8b,
Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247.  Noncitizen voting in state and even federal elections existed
throughout the nineteenth century in the United States, as well, and existed in some forms
as late as 1928.  Ronald Hayduk, Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the US,
26 NEW POL. SCI. 499, 505 (2004).  For an argument that full voting rights should be ex-
tended to noncitizens (a position stronger than the one I argue for here and one that I do
not accept), see Jennifer Gordon, Let Them Vote, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS 43, 43–51 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds.,
1999).
252. WALZER, supra note 60, at 18–19. R
253. SASSEN, supra note 104, at 145. R
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If we reject Pickus’s call for substantial (though not ethnic) re-
quirements for naturalization, what are we left with?  Joseph Carens
helpfully distinguishes between requirements that can be legitimately
enforced by law, norms that should not be legally enforced but may be
encouraged through societal sanctions, and aspirations—our hopes as
to what immigrants will become.254  The majority of what Pickus calls
for, Carens claims, is most properly thought of as aspirational.255  For
the reasons discussed above, I agree with Carens.  The remaining
question, then, is which burdens are requirements that should have
the force of law and which burdens are norms that are properly sub-
ject to societal pressure.
Carens takes a strong view, arguing that the only fully justifiable
and legally enforceable requirement is a term of residence not longer
than five years.256  Any other requirements should only be formal,
such as filling out an application form and paying a modest fee.257
The justification for this strong view, Carens claims, is that living in a
society is what makes someone a member of it, and full membership
should not be kept from de facto members.258  We may legitimately
expect immigrants to learn the language and culture of the state, but
these expectations, Carens claims, are better thought of as norms to
be encouraged by social pressure than as regulations to be enforced
by law.259
Carens’s strong view is perhaps not as far from current practice in
the United States as we might think, since the English language exam,
for example, requires far less than true fluency to pass260 and the “civ-
ics” exam is, at best, an exercise in rote memorization, requiring cor-
rect answers to only six out of ten questions selected from a preset list
of one hundred possible questions.261  In addition, waivers exist for
individuals who are not able to meet even these fairly lax require-
254. Joseph H. Carens, Why Naturalization Should Be Easy: A Response to Noah Pickus, in
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST  CENTURY, supra note 107, at 141, 142. R
255. Id. at 142 (arguing that “most of the things people advocate when they talk about
strengthening or improving the naturalization process” are aspirational).
256. Id. at 142–43.
257. See, e.g., id. at 144 (arguing against “tests of civic and historical knowledge” and
“competence in English” as “requirement[s] for naturalization”).
258. Id. at 143.
259. Id. at 145–46.
260. See, e.g., ANITA BIASE, YOUR U.S. CITIZENSHIP GUIDE: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW TO
PASS YOUR U.S. CITIZENSHIP TEST 142 (2009) (“An applicant for U.S. citizenship does not
necessarily need to be fluent in English, but he or she must have the ability to read, write,
speak, and understand the basics of the English language.”).
261. For a list of potential exam questions, see U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
CIVICS (HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT) QUESTIONS FOR THE NATURALIZATION TEST (rev. 2009),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/100q.pdf.
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ments.262  These waivers, though nominally based on health- or age-
related inability to study,263 are given quite liberally in practice and
are rarely challenged.264
Since the language and civics requirements are clearly less signifi-
cant impediments in current U.S. practice than we might have
thought, should we agree with Carens that liberal states should offi-
cially remove these requirements?  While I think removal is perhaps
the best overall policy, it is not, strictly speaking, a demand of justice.
What is ruled out by my argument is the use of language and civics
requirements to enforce cultural homogeneity.  As Carens rightly
notes, it is of no use, and may in fact be positively harmful, to “legal-
ize” loyalty, patriotism, or identity,265 and language and civics exams
should not be used as backdoor methods for so doing.  Additionally, it
would be unreasonable to expect adult immigrants, most of who work
full time in or out of the home, to gain full fluency or deep knowledge
of civics if resources are not made easily available to them.  A system
that requires passing a fair and reasonable exam or completing a cer-
tain number of language and civics classes provided at public expense
and at various times and locations to gain citizenship, at least if waivers
are available to those who need them, however, would not be an un-
due burden or a violation of the bounds of justice.  After all, natural-
born citizens are also expected, and even required, to attend compul-
sory education, which includes courses that aim to teach at least mini-
mal language and civic knowledge.  If this is not unjust, then the
language and civics requirements I suggest here are not unjust.  That
said, such requirements also do not seem to be required by considera-
tions of justice and may prove to be difficult and expensive to adminis-
ter and ineffective in achieving their goals.  If so, states may be well
advised to follow Carens’s advice and limit formal requirements to a
262. See generally Exceptions & Accommodations, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow “Citizenship Through Naturalization”
hyperlink; then follow “Exceptions & Accommodations” hyperlink) (last updated July 14,
2010) (providing information about exceptions to the various naturalization
requirements).
263. Id.
264. In my experience working with immigrants at a public interest law firm, I saw that
waivers were regularly sought on quite thin health grounds, to say the least.  The idea that
waivers are liberally given and rarely challenged is a sort of “open secret” in the immigra-
tion bar.
265. Carens, supra note 254, at 146. R
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period of residency,266 perhaps with a good standing requirement
included.267
The final requirement that I discuss is the common naturaliza-
tion requirement that immigrants renounce allegiance to other states.
This requirement is related to the question of whether dual citizen-
ship should be allowed.268  The practice of dual citizenship had been,
for many years, disfavored by nearly all countries.269  The naturaliza-
tion oath taken in the United States seems to officially require re-
nouncing prior citizenship before naturalization.270  As recently as
1963, an international convention was held to discuss the goal of re-
ducing dual citizenship.271
More recently, however, the context has changed.  While some
states do not allow dual citizenship, many officially do, and some even
266. See supra text accompanying notes 256–57.  If the point of having naturalization R
requirements is to foster identification with the country of naturalization and if a period of
residence is a proxy for this identification and a way to try to ensure that it takes place,
then in some cases, in which there is an independent reason to think these goals are met in
a shorter period of time and such a rule can be applied in a regular way, a much shorter
period of residence may be appropriate.  Examples include the shorter period of residence
required for naturalization in the United States when the immigrant gains his immigrant
status by marriage to a citizen, or the shorter residence period required for noncitizens
serving in the military. See INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1430(a), 1439 (2006).  My thanks to Kristin
Madison for helpful discussion on this point.
267. While it seems reasonable to require a period of good standing—a period without
arrest for any significant crime (perhaps one equal in length to the residency require-
ment)—for naturalization, I do not give a more detailed analysis of exactly how such a
system should work, if waivers should be available, and if those who commit certain crimes
should be permanently barred from naturalization, assuming they are not deported.  All of
these questions require more detailed knowledge about specific features of the states in
question than can be hoped for from a work of philosophy.
268. This is only part of the question, however, since some people gain dual citizenship
at birth, either because they are born to parents of mixed citizenship and inherit the citi-
zenship of both states by law or because they gain one citizenship from their parents and
another from the location of birth.  For some time, most states required those who claimed
more than one citizenship at birth to renounce one upon reaching adulthood.  This is still
the practice in Germany, though it is now less common in other states. See LYNCH & SIMON,
supra note 88, at 176–77.  I do not devote significant space to this way of gaining dual R
citizenship because much of what I say above applies in this case as well.
269. For a discussion of what he calls “plural citizenship,” see SPIRO, supra note 27, at R
59–67.  President Theodore Roosevelt once stated that the “theory” of dual citizenship was
“a self-evident absurdity.” Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, Henry
Cabot Lodge proclaimed that he could “not assent for a moment to the proposition that
such a thing as dual citizenship is possible.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. The relevant portion of the U.S. naturalization oath reads, “I hereby declare, on
oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a
subject or citizen[ ] . . . .”  8 C.F.R. § 337.1(a) (2010).
271. Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations
in Cases of Multiple Nationality, opened for signature May 6, 1963, 634 U.N.T.S. 221.
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encourage it.272  The United States has never taken practical steps to
make the oath of renunciation effective, and today dual citizenship is
tacitly accepted by the government.273  The Supreme Court has made
it extremely difficult to strip natural-born citizens of their citizenship,
even when they naturalize abroad.274  These changes are attributable
to increased levels of peace and respect for human rights around the
world, among other things.  In the past, one objection to dual citizen-
ship was that it created obligations for states to protect their citizens
against other states that also claimed dominion over the individuals in
question.275  This was viewed as a threat to state sovereignty, under-
stood as the right of states to conduct their internal affairs as they saw
fit.276  As the acceptance of universal human rights has spread, how-
ever, this conception of sovereignty has waned.277  This, in turn, has
made dual citizenship seem less problematic.
In addition, we might think that dual citizenship should be lim-
ited since it allows for dangerous “dual loyalties,”278 under which
272. Peter H. Schuck, Plural Citizenships, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 107, at 149, 154–55. R
273. SPIRO, supra note 27, at 69, 72; Schuck, supra note 272, at 162. R
274. SPIRO, supra note 27, at 68–69; Schuck, supra note 272, at 161–62.  The founda- R
tional case on point is Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). Afroyim is the first in a line of
cases in which the Supreme Court held that only explicit renunciation by an individual,
with the intent that it be effective, could remove citizenship from a natural-born citizen.
The Court stated:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect
every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citi-
zenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.  Our holding does no more than to
give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen
in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.
Id. at 268.  Somewhat lower standards apply for naturalized citizens, who may be stripped
of their citizenship when, for example, it is shown that citizenship was “procured by con-
cealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.” INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b)
(2006).  The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard in a fairly broad way. See gener-
ally, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
275. SPIRO, supra note 27, at 63. R
276. See id. at 70–71 (noting, for example, that in the past “dual Italian and American”
citizenship “might [have] . . . provoke[d] controversy between Italy and the United States,
as the latter sought to intervene on the individual’s behalf against the former’s
mistreatment”).
277. See id. at 71 (noting that, under the new human rights regime, “[i]f Italy treats a
person inconsistent with human rights norms, it has violated international law, and all
states have standing to complain of that violation, even if the individual is merely an Ital-
ian”); see also Kelly, supra note 55, at 188 (arguing that human rights “generate moral obli- R
gations—for non-engagement, aid, or intervention—to be represented within foreign
policy as priorities, insofar as a society is in a favorable position to be able to implement the
policy or has incurred a special debt”).
278. Michael Jones-Correa, Why Immigrants Want Dual Citizenship (and We Should Too): A
Response to Peter Schuck, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,
supra note 107, at 193, 193. R
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some citizens might seek to promote interests other than those of the
state in question.  This worry is less pressing today when the interests
of states are more in line than they were when trade and empire were
primary areas of competition.279  With the end of (at least open) sup-
port for empire, the end of the Cold War, and the move to managed
free trade in the confines of a cooperative body such as the World
Trade Organization, these concerns have taken on less practical
importance.
This concern is grounded in an illiberal attitude—the idea that
“the state” might have interests other than those of its members.  If we
reject this idea and do not falsely assume that interests must be zero-
sum, then this objection loses much of its force.  It is not clear why the
fact that some citizens have concerns for what happens in another
state should be any more problematic than the fact that some citizens
have interests in other groups, some of which (churches or corpora-
tions, for example) also extend beyond the borders of the state.  This
objection, then, provides no categorical reason for rejecting dual
citizenship.
There are also positive reasons for granting dual citizenship.
Rather than fostering conflict, dual citizenship may further ties of co-
operation, friendship, and understanding between states.  This belief
may lay behind the shift toward allowing (even encouraging) dual citi-
zenship in recent years.280  Additionally, there is some evidence that
allowing dual citizenship, rather than preventing assimilation, actually
helps encourage it by removing psychological and sometimes legal
barriers to full membership in the new society.281  When immigrants
do not feel as if they must break all ties to their country of origin, it is
easier for them to become full members of their new societies.282
When legal impediments to becoming full members, such as laws
found in many countries that prevent noncitizens from holding land,
are no longer present, the costs of assimilation become lower and the
process more attractive.283
There are few, if any, compelling reasons to deny dual citizenship
and some good, if not fully obligatory, reasons to allow it.  But, do
principles of justice require states to allow dual citizenship?  This is less
clear, as the arguments presented here do not completely settle the
279. See id.
280. Schuck, supra note 272, at 154 (noting that “the road to dual citizenship seems R
easier to travel today than it was in the past” and exploring reasons for that development).
281. Jones-Correa, supra note 278, at 194–96. R
282. Id. at 196.
283. Id.
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case.  A compelling case against dual citizenship may be found in cer-
tain times and in certain historical circumstances, even if not in our
present situation.  Until such an argument can be articulated, how-
ever, the presumption should be in favor of greater liberty, including
the liberty to have multiple citizenships.284
B. Alienage Law
Last, I touch on alienage law, or the law that determines legal
status within a state on the basis of whether the person in question is a
citizen or not.285  More specifically, I explore whether distinctions as
to social and political rights and benefits based on alienage status,
when applied to permanent residence, are acceptable.286
Owen Fiss argues that principles inherent in the Constitution and
liberal theories of justice require us to treat all people within reach of
the state in the same way, at least with respect to social rights and
benefits.287  This implies that alienage law should not allow for differ-
ences in status between citizens and noncitizens.  Fiss extends his ar-
gument not only to legal permanent residents but to anyone present
in the territory of a state, including those without the legal right to be
present.288  This extension is extremely implausible, but I limit my dis-
cussion to the more easily defensible claim that liberal principles of
justice require us to treat legal permanent residents in exactly, or
284. Peter Spiro, discussing the strong prudential reasons for allowing plural citizen-
ship, pushes further than I do in asserting that dual citizenship should be seen as an impor-
tant human right. See generally Peter Spiro, Dual Citizenship as Human Right, 8 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 111 (2010).  His strongest argument is that rejecting plural citizenship interferes
with the associative rights of individuals.  This argument is not conclusive.  If states are seen
as associations (as Spiro’s argument requires), then they must have some degree of discre-
tion in setting their membership.  Limits on this discretion are set by principles of justice.
But, the mere fact that someone wishes to associate with a state, by itself, is not a considera-
tion of justice.  It is a reason to allow plural citizenship, but other interests, such as the
interests of a society in self-determination, must also be considered.  In my opinion, so
long as the individuals in question are not be rendered stateless, there is no fundamental
right at stake.  Thus, while Spiro’s argument gives further weight to the presumption in
favor of allowing plural citizenship, it does not establish such a presumption as a human
right that all states must respect to be just.
285. See supra note 221 (defining alienage law). R
286. This question is independent of whether such distinctions are desirable as a matter
of sound public policy.  I expect that often they will not be, although I confine myself here
to the narrower question of whether such distinctions are always unjust.  Once again, I
focus on the case of permanent residents and leave the difficult case of guest-workers aside.
287. See generally Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS, supra note 251, at 3, 3–21.  Fiss seems R
willing to allow differences in political rights, though his reasons for so doing are not
completely clear. See id. at 4–5.
288. See id. at 16–17.
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nearly exactly, the same way as citizens, at least with regards to social
and economic rights.289  The primary ground for this requirement,
Fiss argues, is the rejection by liberals of the idea of social caste.290  To
restrict benefits from legal permanent residents, Fiss claims, is to sub-
ject them to principles of subordination that liberals must reject.291
Fiss bases his argument on principles implicit in the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Plyler v. Doe,292 which held that the State
of Texas could not refuse to provide primary education to children on
the basis of alienage classification.293  In Plyler, the Court sought to
prevent the creation and “perpetuation of a subclass” unable to take
part in society that would result if noncitizen children were refused
access to education.294  Fiss wishes to generalize this claim and to ar-
gue that social disability based on any sort of alienage classification is
unacceptable insofar as it tends to perpetuate caste-like social struc-
tures.295  Nearly any social disability for noncitizens implemented at
any point prior to naturalization, Fiss contends, would tend to do
this.296
This claim is not borne out.  Access to citizenship must be fairly
easy.  It must be open to all who want it and who will undertake fairly
limited, largely formal steps to achieve it.  In such a case, the forma-
tion of a perpetual underclass is not a worry that arises out of the
restriction of certain social benefits to those of a certain alienage clas-
sification.  As Alexander Aleinikoff notes, since legal aliens can, at
least after some time, remove themselves from the disadvantaged class
by naturalizing, it is misleading to say that such disability puts caste-
like social structures in place.297  At most, Fiss’s worries might apply to
those who are not eligible for naturalization, such as illegal immi-
grants; but, to imply, as Fiss does, that such aliens should be eligible
for all public benefits is essentially to argue that mere presence is
289. Id. at 19–21.
290. Id. at 7.
291. Id. at 15.
292. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
293. Id. at 230.
294. Id. at 223 (“By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability
to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility
that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.”); id. at 234
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In a sense, then, denial of an education is the analogue of
denial of the right to vote: the former relegates the individual to second-class social status;
the latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage.”).
295. Fiss, supra note 287, at 7. R
296. See id. at 15–16.
297. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, First Class, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS, supra note 251, at 30, 31. R
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enough to establish all ties of community.  This, as Iris Marion Young
points out, cannot be right because it would amount to having no
control over access to social benefits at all.298
Fiss’s proposal has other perverse outcomes as well.  If states are
not able to limit access to benefits to immigrants before naturaliza-
tion, then many states may respond with tighter immigration controls.
The likely tradeoff is not between immigration at a set level, with or
without restrictions on benefits before naturalization, but between
higher and lower levels of immigration.  Since immigration, even with-
out benefits, is more attractive to the would-be immigrant than his
current situation (based on his choice to immigrate at all), then the
system that replaces immigration without access to full benefits for
one of lower immigration makes everyone worse off.  It is hard to see
how such a system could be favored by liberals, especially when easy
access to naturalization makes the perpetuation of an ongoing
subordinate caste impossible.
We might still have worries about this approach, though.  Con-
sider what Hiroshi Motomura calls a “contract approach” to alienage
classification.299  Motomura’s “contract approach” holds that any dep-
rivation of rights or benefits is acceptable so long as it is bargained for
as a condition of entry.300  This seems like what I described above, but
as Motomura points out, in an unrestrained form, such an approach
will lead to a caste system.301  Aliens who would not otherwise be ad-
mitted might, for example, agree to never be eligible for naturaliza-
tion in exchange for admission, and therefore would never gain full
membership and full access to benefits.
If there were no limits on what could be bargained for, this would
be a serious problem.  Such a system would be a libertarian system
(rather than liberal) that gives unrestricted freedom of contract a
298. Iris M. Young, Beyond Borders, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS, supra note 251, at 58, 59–60. R
299. Hiroshi Motomura, Alienage Classifications in a Nation of Immigrants: Three Models of
“Permanent” Residence, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra
note 107, at 199, 200 [hereinafter Motomura, Alienage Classifications].  Motomura has ex- R
tended his analysis in a recent book. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE
LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).  The point at
issue, however, seems to be unaffected.
300. Motomura, Alienage Classifications, supra note 299, at 200. R
301. See id. at 202 (noting that an “alternative consequence of eliminating permanent
residence as a distinct category may be two categories of citizenship, one fuller than the
other”).
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place of pride.302  Liberal theories rightly reject such unrestricted
freedom of contract.303  Just as the types of contracts we make in our
normal dealings are restricted by constitutional law (no slave con-
tracts, for example)304 and by the doctrines of estoppel and uncon-
scionability,305 so the sorts of detriments that could be “bargained” for
in immigration and alienage classifications will be restricted by basic
human rights, which require that at least minimal rights and liberal
principles of justice be met.  These limitations on the contract model
show how some benefit restrictions may be compatible with liberal
principles of justice, at least in some cases.
The above arguments do not, however, imply that restrictions on
access to benefits must be implemented or that so doing is even a
good idea.  At least in wealthy countries, such as the United States,
Canada, and Western Europe, we might think these kinds of restric-
tions are mean and needless and serve no legitimate purpose.
Whether this is true is likely to be a complex empirical matter, but it is
at least a real possibility.  Similarly, it seems at least prima facie plausi-
ble that providing full benefits to immigrants prior to naturalization
will provide them with the necessary resources to integrate into society
more fully and will allow them to feel the bonds of community that
encourage them to do so.306  These are, however, largely questions of
public policy and institutional design that fall outside of this Article.
It is worth noting that the above argument assumes that the
noncitizen in question has a “home” state to which he could return if
he found the situation in the state to which he immigrated undesir-
able.  Obviously, this condition does not apply to refugees, the state-
less, and those in need of temporary protected status, since they
cannot safely return to their home countries.  Because such people do
not have the option of returning home, they are in a different situa-
tion than normal immigrants.  This, it seems, speaks strongly in favor
of granting a larger basket of social benefits to refugees and similarly
302. On how libertarian approaches that place unrestricted freedom of contract at the
center and allow for the alienage of any right differ from liberal systems, see Freeman,
supra note 175, at 131–35. R
303. For a discussion of this point, see FREEMAN, supra note 177, at 51. R
304. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
305. See Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts
to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small Businesses, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 910 (1995)
(noting that the contract doctrines of unconscionability and estoppel allow courts “to in-
ject general notions of equity and fairness into our contracting system”).
306. See Motomura, Allienage Classifications, supra note 299, at 216 (positing a “transition R
model” of naturalization, which involves “[a]n essential . . . period . . . of socioeconomic
integration”).
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situated individuals, though I do not address whether the full range of
social benefits open to citizens is required.307
V. CONCLUSION
I argued in this Article that citizenship remains important, even
in a world that respects human rights.308  I showed what the limits of
citizenship are, how citizenship can be restricted, and when citizen-
ship must be made available.309  I showed that a liberal program for
citizenship should include aspects of both the jus soli and the jus
sanguinis approaches and explained that such rules are not “arbitrary”
in a morally problematic way.310  I clarified that access to citizenship
for immigrants via naturalization must be fairly easy and that restric-
tions, when allowed, must be formal in nature.311  Finally, I showed
that liberal principles can accommodate some restrictions based on
alienage, but that there may be prudential reasons for limiting those
restrictions.312  While difficult questions of nonideal theory remain, I
hope to have provided at least a rough guideline for states seeking to
craft a just citizenship policy in the immigration context.
307. In the United States, refugees and asylees in the first five years of residence are
eligible for certain welfare benefits to which regular immigrants are not.  Thomas J. Espen-
shade et al., Implications of the 1996 Welfare and Immigration Reform Acts for U.S. Immigration,
23 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 769, 771–72 (1997).  There are, however, restrictions on how
long and to what degree these benefits are available even to refugees. See id. at 771–73
(outlining several examples of comparatively increased, but nevertheless restricted,
eligibility).
308. See supra Part II.A–B.
309. See supra Part II.C.
310. See supra Part III.
311. See supra Part IV.A.
312. See supra Part IV.B.
